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This thesis is composed of three essays on endogenous growth and endogenous 
cycle with policy implications. 
The first chapter explores optimal government debt in a dynastic family model 
with endogenous fertility, elastic leisure, and human capital externalities. Due to the 
externality, fertility is higher but leisure, labor and education spending per child are 
lower than their social optimum. Government debt can improve welfare by reducing 
fertility and raising leisure and human capital investment per child. The first-best 
allocation can be achieved when using a lump-sum tax to service government debt 
along with education subsidization. When it is serviced by a labor income tax, 
government debt can also improve welfare, even though it may reduce labor, 
regardless of whether education spending is subsidized. 
The second chapter investigates the effects of different subsidies on growth 
and welfare in an endogenous cycle framework. Unlike existing studies in the R&D 
growth literature where the innovators are granted permanent monopoly right over 
the sale of their invented intermediate goods, we assume the length of patent 
protection is finite (one period in particular), finding some new insights. First, by 
considering the subsidies to R&D investment and the subsidies to newly invented 
intermediate goods, the original critical capital-variety ratio, which distinguishes the 
investment-led (policy-dormant) and innovation-led (policy-active) growth regimes, 
can be reduced substantially. This tends to enhance the chance for the economy to 
vii 
 
stay in the innovation-led growth regime. Second, with subsidies, we may change 
the asymptotic behavior of the capital-variety ratio significantly and eliminate 
cycles and make the economy converge to a balanced growth path. Numerically, the 
adoption of subsidies financed by a consumption tax may achieve a substantial 
welfare gain.  
By extending the same endogenous cycle model to consider a leisure-labor 
trade-off in preferences, the last chapter explores equilibrium labor variations when 
the economy alternates between the investment-led growth (Solow) regime and the 
innovation-led growth (Romer) regime. It finds that equilibrium labor is higher and 
output grows faster in the Solow regime without innovation than in the Romer 
regime with innovation along the period-2 cycles. This result is consistent with the 
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Optimal Government Debt with Endogenous Fertility, Elastic Leisure and 
Human Capital Externalities 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Government debt has long been at the center of macroeconomic analysis. The 
conventional analysis of government debt has largely focused on how government 
debt affects capital accumulation, particularly on the validity of the Ricardian 
equivalence hypothesis. In a model with infinitely-lived agents, the validity of this 
hypothesis is straightforward because agents are only concerned about the overall tax 
liability within their planning horizon, rather than any particular timing of taxes 
under a specific debt policy. Even with finitely-lived agents, government debt is 
neutral when private intergenerational transfers are operative in a dynastic model, 
according to Barro (1974). 
However, the debt neutrality breaks down in the infinitely-live agent model or in 
the dynastic model when extending it to incorporate either a choice of fertility or a 
choice between leisure and labor. On the one hand, for example, by taking fertility as 
a choice variable in a dynastic family model, Lapan and Enders (1990) and Wildasin 
(1990) have shown that government debt is no longer neutral. This is because a rise 
in government debt reduces fertility and raises capital intensity through increasing 
bequests that are part of the cost of rearing children. Carrying Lapan and Ender’s 
framework forward to allow for sustainable growth in a two-sector endogenous 
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growth model without leisure, Zhang (1997) has found that government debt can also 
raise the growth rate of output per capita by reducing fertility and raising labor and 
human capital investment. On the other hand, by allowing for a labor-leisure choice 
(with exogenously fixed fertility), Burbidge (1983) has shown that government debt 
financed by a labor-income tax has a positive effect on leisure, a negative effect on 
labor, and a negative effect on the steady-state capital stock, because the labor income 
tax reduces the after-tax wage (i.e. the real return to labor). In addition, the labor 
income tax also reduces the return to human capital investment and the opportunity 
cost of time for childcare, and hence, it tends to offset the effects of government debt 
on fertility, labor and human capital investment in Zhang (1997). Therefore, when we 
consider elastic leisure, endogenous fertility and labor income taxation all together, it 
is no longer clear how government debt affects fertility, the allocation of time to 
leisure and labor, and the allocation of output to consumption and investment in 
human capital. 
Compared to the literature on how government debt affects allocations of income 
and time, much less attention has been paid to its welfare consequence as well as its 
optimal scale that maximizes social welfare. The existing results about the welfare 
implication of government debt in the literature are also different between models 
with fertility and human capital externalities on the one hand and models with a 
labor-leisure trade-off and labor income taxation on the other. In a neoclassical model 
with a labor-leisure trade-off, Burbidge (1983) has argued that government debt 
financed by labor-income taxes is welfare reducing because it reduces labor and 
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capital stock and raises leisure by reducing the after-tax wage rate.  
 Considering endogenous fertility and human capital externality in a dynastic 
model without leisure, on the other hand, Zhang (2003, 2006) has shown that 
government debt financed by lump-sum taxes can improve welfare in the presence of 
human capital externalities. Because of such externalities, education investment for 
children is too low and fertility is too high compared to their social optimum, as 
typically observed in developing countries. By raising the bequest cost of having a 
child, government debt financed by lump-sum taxes reduces fertility and hence raises 
human capital investment per child through the well-known quantity-quality trade-off 
concerning children. The optimal level of government debt financed by lump-sum 
taxes is thus set to reduce fertility and raise human capital investment toward their 
social optimum. He has also shown that combining government debt with education 
subsidies and consumption taxes can achieve the first-best outcome. However, these 
models assume inelastic labor without leisure and ignore income taxes, and therefore 
in these models tax distortions are essentially absent when collecting tax revenue for 
government debt repayment. This is highly unrealistic and lacks practical relevance, 
particularly because Turnovsky (2000) shows that the inclusion of an endogenous 
labor-leisure trade-off leads to fundamental changes in the economy's equilibrium 
structure as there is an equilibrium growth-leisure trade-off.  
Given the different implications of government debt for labor, human capital 
investment and social welfare in the related literature that separates endogenous 
fertility from elastic leisure and labor income taxation, it is interesting to ask which 
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force dominates when considering them together. First, it is interesting to know how 
government debt affects fertility and allocations of time and output (labor and human 
capital investment in particular) in this unified framework. Second, it is interesting to 
know whether government debt can still improve social welfare when endogenous 
fertility meets endogenous leisure in the presence of human capital externalities and 
tax distortions.  
We will carry out this investigation in the present chapter with or without 
education subsidies.1  We begin with a comparison between the social planner 
solution and a competitive solution in an economy without government intervention. 
In this comparison, fertility is above its social optimum, while leisure, labor and 
human capital investment are below their social optimum because human capital 
externalities reduce the private rate of return on human capital investment from the 
social rate. The above-social-optimum fertility is crucial for both leisure and labor to 
fall below their social optimum, because rearing children is time intensive as some 
minimum amount of time is needed for each child. If fertility were fixed then the 
under-investment in human and physical capital would likely cause the marginal 
product of labor to be below its social optimum and hence leisure to be above its 
social optimum. 
We then examine how government debt affects household decisions and also 
derive its welfare implications in three cases differentiated by what type of tax is used 
and by whether the education subsidy is used. First, we show that combining 
                                                              
1 As shown in Zhang (2003), an education subsidy alone cannot eliminate the under-investment in education 
and the over-reproduction of the population at the same time in the presence of human capital externalities. 
Thus, using government debt and education subsidies together can do better than using each of them alone.  
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government debt with education subsidies financed by a lump-sum tax can achieve 
the first-best outcome. In this case, the optimal ratio of debt to output and the optimal 
rate of the education subsidy together raise leisure, labor and education spending to 
their social optimum and reduce fertility and consumption spending to their social 
optimum at the same time. Also, we derive conditions characterizing the second-best 
government debt and education subsidies financed by a labor-income tax. The 
labor-income tax reduces the after-tax rate of return on human capital and the 
opportunity cost of spending time on leisure and rearing children. Thus, it tends to 
reduce education spending and raise leisure and fertility at the same time, offsetting 
partly the effect of government debt on fertility and labor and the effect of education 
subsidies on education spending but reinforcing the effect of government debt on 
leisure. Moreover, we derive conditions characterizing the third-best government debt 
serviced by a labor-income tax without education subsidies. In particular, government 
debt financed by labor income taxes in this model can improve welfare even when it 
raises leisure and reduces labor, as opposed to the results in Burbidge (1983). 
Finally, for plausible parameterizations, we explore the quantitative implications 
numerically. The numerical results suggest that the optimal debt-output ratio may be 
as high as 6.7% in the first-best case, 11.6% in the second-best case and 8.2% in the 
third-best case. In addition, the welfare gain, in terms of equivalent rises in 
consumption in all periods from the no-government case, can be as high as 7.25% in 
the first-best case, 5.64% in the second-best case and 0.47% in the third-best case.   
In all the three scenarios of government debt policy, a rise in government debt has 
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a positive effect on leisure as in Burbidge (1983) and a negative effect on fertility 
under the restriction on taste parameters as in Zhang (2003, 2006). However, since 
leisure is below its social optimum in the presence of human capital externalities in 
our model, the positive effect of government debt on leisure is part of the welfare 
gain, rather than a welfare loss, of the debt policy. But different from Burbidge 
(1983), government debt can raise labor in our model, at the same time as it raises 
leisure, by reducing fertility (hence freeing time from child rearing). In a nutshell, the 
present paper reaches a different result on the welfare implication of government debt 
from models with a labor-leisure choice and with exogenously fixed fertility. Also, it 
extends the model in Zhang (2003, 2006) to a more comprehensive one with a 
realistic labor-leisure choice and realistic income taxes. In particular, our model 
differs from both Burbidge (1983) and Zhang (2003, 2006) by permitting an outcome 
in which government debt reduces fertility but raises labor, leisure and social welfare 
at the same time. Finally, we will show that the optimal government debt policy is 
time-consistent, that is, the current generation has no incentive to deviate from it 
when expecting future generations to follow it.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the 
model. Section 1.3 characterizes the competitive equilibrium and reports results in 
the three cases with either lump-sum taxation or labor-income taxation and with or 
without education subsidies. The last section concludes the paper. Proofs of the 




1.2 The model 
This model has an infinite number of periods and overlapping-generations of a large 
number of identical agents who live for two periods. Old agents work and choose 
their allocations of time and income and the number of identical children. Each old 
agent has one unit of time endowment. Rearing a child needs v fixed units of time, 
implying an upper-bound,1/ v , on fertility, tn . Each working generation has a size 
1 1t t tL n L   with a time script t ; and each agent takes economy-wide average and 
aggregate variables as given. To distinguish an individual quantity of a variable x  
from its average quantity per worker, we use x  for the latter, while we denote 
aggregate quantities for population and allocations in an upper case X. In equilibrium, 
we have x x  by symmetry since agents in the same generation are identical.  
Extending Lapan and Enders (1990) and Zhang (2003) by adding leisure, tz , we 
assume the preference of an old agent as: 
1ln ln lnt t t t tV c n z V       ,    , 0   ,  0 1  ,              (1.1) 
where tc stands for consumption,  the taste for the number of children,  the taste 
for leisure, and the taste for per child welfare (or the subjective discount factor). 
According to Turnovsky (2000), the inclusion of an endogenous labor-leisure 
trade-off leads to fundamental changes in the economy's equilibrium structure as 
there is an equilibrium growth-leisure trade-off. His claim will be echoed in our 
extended model with elastic leisure, engendering new implications for time 
allocation and social welfare especially when labor income taxation is used to 
finance the repayment of government debt. Concerning the functional form, the 
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advantage of a logarithmic utility function is to generate proportional allocations of 
time and income that are constant over the entire equilibrium path of the economy. 
Without this assumption, there would be no reduced-form solution in the model that 
is essential for the welfare analysis. 
The production of final output tY  uses physical capital tK  and effective labor 
t t tL l h  as inputs according to: 
 1t t t t tY DK L l h   ,  0D  , 0 1  ,                            (1.2) 
where tl  and th  are per worker labor and human capital, respectively. We assume 
that physical capital and human capital depreciate fully in one period, as one period 
in this model may correspond to 30 years. 
The education of a child depends on the investment of the final good per child, te , 
the human capital of his parent, th , and the average human capital in the economy, 
th : 
 111t t t th Ae h h      ,  0A  , 0 1  , 0 1  .                  (1.3) 
When 1  , there are positive spillovers from th  to every child’s learning. We will 
show that education spending per child te will be proportional to parental human 
capital th . From this and a log version of the education technology (1.3), the elasticity 
of the human capital of a child with respect to that of his parent is equal to the sum of 
the share parameters associated with parental human capital: )1(   . We can 
then use the empirical estimation of this elasticity in the literature to pin down the 
degree of the human capital externality in the formation of human capital. According 
to empirical evidence in Solon (1999), among others, the elasticity of children’s 
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earnings with respect to their parents’ earnings is around 0.4-0.6 in the United States. 
Taking the elasticity at the mid-point 0.5 and setting 15.0 , the degree of the 
externality relative to parental human capital within families,1  , can be pinned 
down to 0.59. In a similar human capital equation, Borjas (1995) runs regressions of 
children’s skills on two variables: parental skills and the mean skills of the ethnic 
group of the parents’ generation. In doing so, he uses data sets in the United States 
and uses either education attainment or the log real wage as the proxy for skills. The 
estimated coefficient on the mean human capital or mean skills of the ethnic group in 
the parents’ generation (defined as ethnic capital therein) is 0.18 when education 
attainment is used as the proxy, and is 0.30 when the log wage is used. Applying 
these estimates to the coefficient (1 )(1 )    in our model leads to 
1 0.21  and1 0.35  , respectively, for 0.15  . Since ethnic capital is only 
one of some possible components accounting for average human capital of the 
parental generation, we will use Solon's estimation for our simulations later. In 
addition, this human capital externality in education is essential for the convergence 
of income inequality in models with innate ability shocks to individuals (e.g. Zhang, 
2005); without the externality, inequality would rise forever without any upper limit. 
However, this type of externality in education differs from another type of externality 
in production whereby average human capital generates spillovers to the productivity 
of each worker. Qualitatively, however, these two forms of externalities should yield 
similar results since they reduce private returns to human capital from the social rate.   
Factors are paid by their marginal products. Normalize the price of the final good 
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to unity. The wage rate per unit of effective labor, tw , and the real interest factor, tr , 
are then given by 
 1t tw D    ,                                               (1.4) 
1
t tr D
   ,                                                   (1.5) 
where  t t t tk l h  is the physical capital-effective labor ratio with t t tk K L (i.e. 
physical capital per worker). Accordingly, t t t t t ty Y L D l h
   is per worker 
output.  
An old agent devotes tvn  units of labor time to rearing children, tz units to 
enjoying leisure, and the remaining 1t t tl vn z    to working. At the beginning of 
adulthood, everyone receives a bequest plus interest income, t tr a , from his parent. 
Wage earnings and bequest incomes are spent on consumption, the education of 
children, and bequests to children: 
  11t t t t t t t t t t t tc a r vn z w h e n a n        ,                         (1.6) 
where t  is a net lump-sum tax ( if positive) or transfer (if negative). A labor income 
tax will be introduced later in this paper. 
The government issues one-period bonds and collects taxes to service debt 
repayment: 
1t t t t tn b b r    ,                                                 (1.7) 
where tb  is the amount of outstanding debt per worker.  
Without uncertainties in the model, government bonds and physical capital are 
perfect substitutes. So the capital market clears when: 
 t t t tK L a b  .                                                (1.8) 
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In per worker terms, t t tk a b  . 
 
1.3 The competitive equilibrium and results of government debt 
We will consider optimal debt in three cases. In the first case, the government uses a 
lump-sum tax to service its debt and finance education subsidies. In the second case, 
the government uses a labor-income tax to service its debt and education subsidies. In 
the third case, it uses the labor-income tax to service its debt without education 
subsidies. Considering these cases separately can help understand the forces at work. 
 
1.3.1 Government debt with a lump-sum tax and an education subsidy  
In this case, the government issues one-period bonds and collects a lump-sum tax to 
service its debt and education subsidies. Therefore, the individual’s budget constraint 
becomes: 
  11 (1 )t t t t t t t t t t t tc a r vn z w h s e n a n         ,                     (1.9) 
where s is the rate of the education subsidy. 
For bonds and physical capital are perfect substitutes, they earn the same return, 
tr . The government budget constraint is  
1t t t t t t t tn b b r s e n    ,                                          (1.10) 
The problem of agents maximizing utility by the choice of ( 1ta  , 1th  , tn , tz ) is 
formulated in the Bellman’s equation: 
   
1 1
1 1 1, , ,
, max ln ln ln ,
t t t t
t t t t t t t t ta h n z
V a h c n z V a h  
 
        ,           (1.11) 
subject to  
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       11 11 11 1 ( )t t t t t t t t t t t t t tc a r vn z w h s n h A h h n a              ,  
taking the sequences of  , , ,t t t th r w   as given. In this set up, we have used (1.3) to 
substitute 1th   for te . 









 ,                                                   (1.12) 
      1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1t t t t t t t
t t t
n s vn z w h s n e
c e c
       

      ,          (1.13) 
  11t t t t
t t
vw h s e a
c n





 .                                                    (1.15) 
In (1.12), the marginal loss in the parent’s utility from leaving an additional unit 
of bequests to each child equals the marginal gain in children’s utility through 
increasing their bequest income. In (1.13), the marginal loss in the parent’s utility 
from investing an additional unit in children’s education equals the marginal gain in 
children’s utility through increasing their wage income and making them more 
effective in educating their own children. In (1.14), the marginal loss in the parent’s 
utility from having an additional child, through giving up   11t t t tvw h s e a    units 
of wage income, is equal to the marginal gain in the parent’s utility from enjoying the 
additional child. In (1.15), the marginal loss in the parent’s utility from the reduced 
income, as a result of working less, equals the marginal gain in parent’s utility from 
enjoying leisure time.  
Specifically, the competitive equilibrium is characterized by equations (1.2) to 
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(1.5), (1.8) to (1.10), 1t t tl vn z   , and (1.12) to (1.15). Since in equilibrium we 
have x x  for , , , , , , ,x a b h k l z y n , we may drop the overhead bar in the 
equilibrium analysis.  
In order to solve for the proportional allocations, let 1a t t ta n y  , 
1b t t tb n y  , c t tc y  , 1k t t tk n y  , and e t t te n y  , where a  is the 
fraction of output left as bequests, b  the debt-output ratio, c the fraction of 
output consumed, k  the fraction of output invested in physical capital, and e the 
fraction of output invested in human capital. Starting with the initial period (time 0), 
the solution for all 0t   is given by  
 











       

















     ,                                           (1.19) 
 
   
1
1 1
c b k e






                
,                       (1.20) 
   1 1cc b k ez s

  
          ,                          (1.21) 
   
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             .                 (1.22) 
Note that, if the taste for the number of children is sufficiently strong such 
that  1b k e cs           , then there exists a unique interior solution for 
fertility and other decision variables. It can be shown that this condition is also the 
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sufficient condition for the unique interior solution to be the optimal equilibrium 
solution in a way similar to that in Zhang (2006).  
Observe that the above solutions for the proportional allocation of 
output  , , ,a c e k    , fertility n, leisure z and labor l are indeed constant over time 
as expected in this Cobb-Douglas specification. Also it can be verified that 
 , , , , , ,a c e k n z l    satisfies the equilibrium conditions (1.2) to (1.5), (1.8) to 
(1.10), 1t t tl vn z   , and (1.12) to (1.15) for 0t  , given any initial state, any 
constant ratio of government debt to output and any constant subsidy rate. As a result, 
they are the equilibrium solutions on the entire equilibrium path of the economy.  
Another observation is that, from (1.16) to (1.22), government debt has real 
effects in this model as in Burbidge (1983), Lapan and Enders (1990), Wildasin (1990) 
and Zhang (2003, 2006). In particular, leisure, tz , and labor supply, tl , are increasing 
in b . Meanwhile, education subsidies have a positive effect on the fraction of 
output spent on children’s education, a negative effect on the fraction of output on 
consumption, a negative effect on fertility as well as a positive effect on labor supply. 
We summarize the results below. 
 
Proposition 1.1. With a lump-sum tax, a rise in the debt-output ratio raises both 
leisure and labor but reduces fertility, while it has no effect on proportional output 
allocation. A rise in the rate of education subsidy raises both labor and the fraction 





The results in Proposition 1.1 extend those in Zhang (2003) to capture a positive 
effect of government debt on leisure. They also extend those in Burbidge (1983) to 
capture a negative effect of government debt on fertility, and therefore a positive 
effect on labor as opposed to a negative effect on labor in his work. Interestingly and 
intuitively, government debt in our model raises both leisure and labor at the same 
time because it reduces fertility and hence saves time from child rearing. These 
results in Proposition 1.1 hinge on the use of the lump-sum tax. When a labor income 
tax is used later, however, the results will differ in general and the proportional output 
allocation will depend on the debt-output ratio in particular. 
To determine the optimal level of government debt, it is essential to express the 
solution for the welfare level in terms of the initial state, the education-subsidy rate 
and the debt-output ratio. We achieve this by working through the entire dynamic 
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,                             (1.23) 
where 0B is a constant ( unresponsive to time, government debt or the education 
subsidy), and 
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      . 
The solution for individuals’ welfare in (1.23) is fully characterized by the initial 
state  0 0,k h , the parameters in preferences and technologies, the debt-output ratio 
and the rate of education subsidies. Note also that government debt and education 
subsidies influence welfare only through the term ( , )bB s  . We will then focus on 
( , )bB s   in dealing with the optimal ratio of government debt to output. 
To compare the competitive equilibrium solution to the social planner solution, 
we define the latter as: maximizing tV  in (1.1) subject to 
  1 11t t t t t t t t tc Dk vn z h e n k n          and 11t t th Ae h   , where the social 
planner internalizes the externality by setting t th h . Clearly, the social planner 
solution should be a special case of the competitive solution in (1.16) - (1.23) 
with 1  , 0s  and 0tb   for all t (i.e. 0b  ). It is also clear that without the 
externality, government debt must have an adverse welfare effect since it always 
affects fertility, leisure and human capital investment per child regardless of whether 
the externality exists.  
The key question that motivates the analysis of optimal government debt is: how 
does the competitive solution without government intervention ( 0s b  and 1  ) 
compare to the social planner solution ( 1  )? It is easy to verify 
that: 0n    , 0c    , 0k    , 0e    , 0z     and 
0l    when there is neither government debt nor  education subsidy involved. 
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Thus, fertility and the fraction of output spent on consumption are too high, the 
fraction of output spent on children’s education and the fraction of time spent on 
leisure and labor are too low, and the fraction of output invested in physical capital is 
at its first-best. When labor supply is too low, the level of output per worker in the 
competitive solution should be lower than in the social planner solution in all periods, 
given any initial stock of capital. These results are summarized below: 
 
Lemma 1.1. In the equilibrium solution with 10   and without government 
intervention, fertility and the fraction of output spent on consumption are above their 
social optimums, while leisure, labor and the fraction of output spent on education 
are below their social optimums.   
 
It is thus interesting to see whether government debt along with education 
subsidies under a lump-sum tax can close the gap between the competitive solution 
with externalities and the social planner solution. This has been achieved in Zhang 
(2003, 2006) without the leisure-labor trade-off, whereby two independent policy 
instruments (government debt and education subsidies) are both necessary and 
sufficient to fully close two gaps in fertility and education spending per child between 
the competitive solution and the social planner solution. When adding elastic leisure 
to the problem in our model, one more gap in the labor-leisure trade-off emerges and 
therefore it is not warranted in priori whether the two instruments can close three 




Proposition 1.2. Debt and education subsidies financed by lump-sum taxes achieve 









    , 
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    
   
             
. 
When expecting future generations to follow this optimal policy, the current 
generation has no incentive to deviate from it.   
 
The intuition of Proposition 1.2 is as follows. Neither government debt nor 
education subsidies alone can achieve the first-best, albeit each of them tips the 
leisure-labor trade-off and the quantity-quality trade-off concerning children in the 
right directions. In particular, government debt serviced by a lump-sum tax has no 
effect on the fraction of output spent on children’s education ( e ), which is below its 
first-best in the presence of the human capital externality. However, it has a negative 
effect on fertility according to (1.20) and a positive effect on leisure and labor 
according to (1.21) and (1.22). By contrast, education subsidies have a standard 
positive effect on the fraction of output spent on children’s education according to 
(1.16), a negative effect on fertility according to (1.20) as well as a positive effect on 
labor according to (1.22). Nevertheless, when the fraction of output spent on 
children’s education is raised to its first-best level by education subsidies alone, one 
can easily verify that fertility would still be above its first-best level and leisure and 
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labor would still be below their first-best levels. Therefore, combining government 
debt with education subsidies should do better than using them separately.  
Practically, it is interesting as well as important to know the size of the optimal 
debt-output ratio and the education-subsidy rate for plausible parameterizations. The 
values of the parameters are either chosen in line with those in the literature when 
available (e.g., 0.6  , 0.33  ), or  chosen to generate plausible values for 
fertility, leisure, labor and the fractions of income invested in both types of capital 
(e.g., 0.1v  , 0.15  , 0.93  and 0.33  ). Taking one period as 30 years, the 
value of the discounting factor per period at 0.6  corresponds to an annual 
discounting factor of 0.9855as in Gomme et al. (2001). The value of the share 
parameter of physical capital in production at 0.33  is widely used in the literature. 
A smaller share parameter associated with physical inputs in education ( 15.0 ) 
than in production reflects the fact that education is less physical capital intensive 
than production. Further, according to empirical evidence in Solon (1999), the degree 
of the externality, , is likely around 0.412 as mentioned earlier below equation (1.3). 
 Table 1.1 reports the simulation results for the optimal subsidy rate, the optimal 
debt-output ratio, and the welfare level in terms of ( , )bB s   across four scenarios: 
no government intervention; the first-best policy given in Proposition 1.2; and two 
more cases to be analyzed in Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3. In the first-best case, the 
optimal debt-output ratio is around 4.7% according to Table 1.1. (The last column of 
Table 1.1 reports the rise in consumption in every period from the no-government 
case so as to raise welfare to the same level as that with government debt; more 
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details in this regard will be given later.) In the real world, however, taxes are 
functions of income or spending rather than lump-sum. We consider a labor income 
tax in the rest of the paper. 
 
1.3.2 Government debt with a labor income tax and an education subsidy  
In this case, we introduce a labor-income tax into the model as in Burbidge (1983). 
Then, the new budget constraint becomes: 
    11 1 (1 )t t t t t t l t t t t t tc a r vn z w h s e n a n           ,              (1.24) 
where l  is the labor-income tax rate, as opposed the lump-sum tax used in Zhang 
(2003, 2006). Our combined consideration of labor income taxation and elastic 
leisure can thus capture realistic tax distortions for government debt repayment in the 
real world. The lump-sum tax or transfer in (1.24) will be forced to zero after the 
initial period in which it can be used to cancel out any residual change in the 
government budget constraint. The government runs a balanced budget according to: 
 1 1t t t t t l t t t t t t tn b b r vn z w h s e n        .                         (1.25) 
The capital market clearing condition is the same as (1.8). 
In this case, the problem of agents maximizing utility by choice of 
 1 1, , ,t t t ta h n z   is formulated in the same way as in section 1.3.1, and then the 









 ,                                                   (1.26) 
       1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1t t t l t t t t
t t t
n s vn z w h s n e
c e c
        
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       ,    (1.27) 
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    11 1t l t t t
t t
vw h s e a
c n
      ,                                (1.28) 




   .                                             (1.29) 
According to these optimal conditions, the labor income tax clearly reduces the 
marginal benefit of human capital investment in (1.27), the cost of a child in (1.28) 
and the cost of leisure in (1.29) by reducing the after-tax wage rate. Because of these 
tax effects, we expect the results to be different from those in the previous section and 
those in Zhang (2003, 2006). Particularly, it is important, theoretically and practically, 
to explore whether the tax distortion can outweigh the benefits from education 
subsidies and government debt.  
 Forcing the lump-sum tax to be zero and using (1.26) and tttt ccbb // 11   , 
dividing both sides of the government constraint by output ty , we rewrite the 
government budget constraint as: 
el
b
b s )1(  .                (1.30) 














































,                        (1.36) 
 (1 ) 1
(1 ) ( )
e b
b c k e
s
l
   
      
               .                         (1.37) 
In the equilibrium solutions given above, we have used the government budget 
balance in (1.30) to replace the labor-income tax by the education-subsidy rate and 
the debt-output ratio. The solution for the welfare level as a function of government 
policy is the same as that in (1.23). 
From (1.31) and (1.34) with a labor-income tax, the higher the subsidy rate, the 
higher the fraction of income will be invested in children’s education and the lower 
the fraction of income will be spent on consumption, mainly because the substitution 
effect of the subsidy dominates the opposite tax effect. With the labor-income tax, the 
effect of a higher education subsidy on fertility and time allocation is more 
complicated than in the case with a lump-sum tax. This is because the subsequent rise 
in the labor-income tax reduces the opportunity cost of time spent on both leisure and 
child rearing and hence tends to raise fertility and leisure. From (1.32), the fraction of 
income invested in physical capital is independent of the education subsidy and the 
debt-output ratio.  
With the labor-income tax, the effect of government debt is also more 
complicated than in the previous case with a lump-sum tax. Concerning how it affects 
fertility and leisure, there is a positive direct effect in (1.35) and (1.36), while there 
are indirect effects through affecting consumption and education spending. The effect 
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of government debt on labor is even more complicated: The positive one in the 
denominator of (1.37) is also present in (1.22) where the tax was lump-sum; but the 
negative one in the numerator of (1.37) is absent in (1.22) and thus can be attributed 
to the labor income tax. There also indirect effects of government debt on labor 
through affecting income allocations. Concerning how government debt affects the 
income allocation, from (1.31) there is a negative effect of government debt on the 
fraction of income spent on education, chiefly because of the use of the labor-income 
tax that reduces the rate of return on education investment. However, since 
government debt may reduce fertility, it may increase the ratio of education spending 
per child to income. We summarize the effects of government debt and education 
subsidies below and relegate the proof to Appendix A.3. 
 
Proposition 1.3.  Consider a labor income tax along with government debt and 
education subsidies. At 0 bs , a rise in the debt-output ratio, b , raises leisure 
and the fraction of output spent on consumption but reduces the fraction of output 
spent on education, and has no effect on the fraction of output invested in physical 
capital.  Also, it reduces (raises) fertility if  is smaller (greater) than 
  1 (1 ) 1 1 /{(1 )[1 (1 )]}                  ; and it raises (reduces) 
labor if  is smaller (greater) than /(1 )    . At 0 bs , a rise in the 
education subsidy rate, s, reduces the fraction of output spent on consumption and 
raises the fraction of output spent on education and leisure, and has no effect on the 
fraction of output invested in physical capital. Also it reduces (raises) fertility if  is 
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smaller (greater) than   1 (1 ) 1 1 /{(1 )[1 (1 )]}                  ; 
and it raises (reduces) labor if  is smaller (greater) than /(1 )    . 
 
 One key result in Proposition 1.3 is that government debt and the education 
subsidy financed by the labor income tax can reduce fertility when the taste for the 
number of children,  , is not too strong relative to the taste for the welfare of 
children,  . In particular, if leisure were exogenously given ( 0 ), then the 
condition for government debt to reduce fertility would be )1/(   . Another 
key result is that both government debt and the education subsidy financed by the 
labor income tax raise leisure because the labor-income tax reduces the opportunity 
cost of time spent on leisure. The opposite effects of government debt and the 
education subsidies on output allocation offset each other, while their similar effects 
on fertility and leisure reinforce each other to dominate the effects of the labor 
income tax. With the labor income tax, the effects of government debt and education 
subsidies on labor are signed by the same condition according to the strength of the 
taste for leisure. When the taste for leisure is sufficiently weak, the positive effects of 
government debt and education subsidies on labor dominate the negative effect of the 
accompanying labor income tax on labor, generating a net positive effect on labor. 
Conversely, when the taste for leisure becomes strong enough, it strengthens the labor 
income tax effect on labor and dominates the opposite effects of government debt and 
education subsidies. Therefore, the net effect of government debt on welfare depends 
mainly on its effects on fertility and on time allocations to leisure and labor. 
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We present the optimal debt policy with the labor income tax below and place the 
derivation in Appendix A.4. 
 
Proposition 1.4. Government debt and education subsidies financed by a 
labor-income tax achieve the second-best outcome such that: 
     
     
1 4 2 31 1 1 1 11
2 1 1 1 1 1
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s
       
      
                    
, 
where 
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s    

         , 
With * (1 ) /[1 (1 )]e         . When expecting future generations to follow this 
optimal policy, the current generation has no incentive to deviate from it.   
 
As in the case with a lump-sum tax, the optimal debt and the optimal education 
subsidy financed by a labor-income tax can achieve the first-best allocation of output. 
However, it cannot achieve the first-best level of fertility and leisure, because the 
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labor-income tax reduces the opportunity cost of spending time on both leisure and 
rearing children. Therefore, the resultant levels of fertility and leisure tend to be 
higher in the second-best case than in the first-best case, and labor is lower than its 
social optimum. 
In row three of Table 1.1, we report the numerical results corresponding to the 
optimal policy in Proposition 1.4. Compared to the first-best policy, the level of the 
second-best debt-output ratio and the level of the education subsidy rate are both 
higher, which are around 7.3% and 47.9% respectively. The intuition is that the 
labor-income tax reduces the rate of return on human capital investment and hence 
calls for a higher education-subsidy rate and a higher debt-output ratio compared to 
the case where a lump-sum tax is used. Also, the output allocation in the second-best 
case in Table 1.1 is indeed the same as that in the first-best case, while fertility and 
leisure are higher. In addition, labor is higher than in the case without government 
intervention but it is lower than its social optimum. In Figures 1.1 and 1.2, we vary 
the debt-output ratio from 0 to 20% and the subsidy rate from 0 to 90%, and find the 
subsequent welfare levels under 0.33  and 0.9  respectively. It is worth 
nothing that the surface of the welfare level is concave and smooth, implying the 
existence and uniqueness of the optimal policy. A formal proof of the sufficient 
condition for the optimal debt policy will be carried out in the next case in which 
there is no explicit solution. 
 
1.3.3 Government debt with a labor income tax and without education subsidy 
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In this case, we explore how government debt serviced by a labor income tax affects 
household decisions and whether it can improve on the competitive solution in the 
absence of education subsidies. This case is relevant because it allows us to 
concentrate on the main mechanisms in Burbidge (1983) and Zhang (2003): 
government debt serviced by the labor income tax in the presence of the trade-off 
between labor and leisure in the former and the trade-off between the quality and 
quantity of children in the latter. Since government debt reduces (raises) welfare in 
the former (latter), it is interesting and important to know which mechanism 
dominates for a net welfare effect. 
The household budget constraint becomes: 
    11 1t t t t t t l t t t t t tc a r vn z w h e n a n          .                  (1.38) 
Correspondingly, the government’s budget constraint becomes: 
 1 1t t t t t l t t t tn b b r vn z w h       .                               (1.39) 
As in Section 1.3.2, we will force the lump-sum tax or transfer to zero after the initial 
period and we can rewrite the government budget constraint as: 
)1(  
 lbb .                                            (1.40) 
The capital market clearing condition is the same as (1.8). 
We construct the same dynamic programming problem as in the previous two 
cases and achieve the following solutions to the proportional allocations of output to 
children’s education investment, physical capital investment, bequests, consumption 
and fertility and the time allocation among childcare, leisure and labor. The solution 
for k is the same as in (1.32) and the solutions for a  and c have the same 
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             .                         (1.44) 
In the equilibrium solutions given above, we have used the government budget 
constraint in (1.40) to replace the labor-income tax by the debt-output ratio. The 
solution for the welfare level as a function of government policy is the same as that in 
(1.23). 
The effects of government debt on the equilibrium solutions are similar to those 
given in Proposition 1.3. The difference from the effects in Proposition 1.3 is that 
they are now valid for all permissible value of government debt. Differentiating the 
solutions with respect to the debt-output ratio leads to: 
  
Proposition 1.5. Without education subsidy, a rise in government debt financed by a 
labor income tax raises leisure and the fraction of income for consumption, reduces 
the fraction of income for education, and has no effect on the fraction of output 
invested in physical capital. Also, it raises (reduces) labor if  is smaller (greater) 
than /(1 )    ; it reduces (raises) fertility if  is smaller (greater) than 




 The effects of government debt in Proposition 1.5 are equilibrium results that 
have taken the government budget balance into account. To assist the derivation and 
understanding of the optimal level of government debt, it is worth noting that a rise in 
government debt financed by the labor income tax may raise or reduce labor 
depending on the strength of the taste for leisure relative to the welfare and the 
number of children. When the taste for leisure is relatively strong, the rise in 
government debt raises leisure but reduces labor. When the taste for leisure is 
relatively weak, the rise in government debt raises labor and leisure together. The 
intuition comes from the fact that the accompanying rise in the labor income tax 
reduces the cost of leisure and the after-tax return to labor. Thus, the positive effect of 
government debt financed by the labor income tax on labor emerges only when the 
taste for leisure is relatively weak. These rich effects of government debt financed by 
a labor income tax on leisure and labor are interesting in their own right, and can only 
emerge when considering endogenous fertility and the trade-off between labor and 
leisure altogether. For instance, on the one hand, without endogenous fertility 
government debt serviced by a labor income tax would raise leisure and reduce labor 
at the same time for certain, as in Burbidge (1983). On the other hand, without elastic 
leisure in Zhang (2003, 2006) a decline in fertility due to government debt goes hand 
in hand with a rise in labor supply as all the time units saved from raising fewer 
children add to labor supply. This overstates the positive effect of government debt on 
labor supply and rules out the possibility for government debt to reduce labor supply.   
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We are now ready to characterize the optimal debt policy supported by the 
labor-income tax in the absence of the education subsidy. We present the results 
below and relegate the proof to Appendix A.5. 
 
Proposition 1.6. Without education subsidy, the optimal level of government debt 
financed by a labor income tax is equal to zero for 1  (i.e. without externalities); 
it is unique and positive for 10   if the tastes for leisure and for the number of 
children are sufficiently weak relative to the taste for the welfare of children and if 
 satisfies:   
     { [1 (1 )] (1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )}
(1 )[1 (1 )] (1 ) 1
               
               . 
The current generation has no incentive to deviate from this optimal debt policy when 
expecting future generations to follow it.  
 
 The reason government debt financed by the labor-income tax can improve 
welfare is again that the human capital externality leads to above-socially-optimal 
fertility and below-socially-optimal leisure and labor, despite that it reduces the 
fraction of income spent on the education of all children. When this policy reduces 
fertility, it may raise education spending per child relative to output per worker 
through the typical trade-off between the quantity and the quality of children. The 
welfare implication in this case differs from the case in Burbidge (1983) although 
government debt raises leisure in both cases. A key factor for the difference in the 
welfare implication is the existence of the human capital externality and the 
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consideration of the trade-off between the quantity and the quality of children. 
Without the externality, government debt would be welfare reducing in this dynastic 
model because it still changes fertility and leisure. Without the trade-off between the 
quantity and the quality of children by treating fertility as exogenous, the human 
capital externality would imply that leisure should be above its social optimum in the 
absent of government intervention because the private rate of return on human capital 
is lower than the social rate and hence the opportunity cost of leisure and childcare 
for an individual is lower than the social cost.  
 One interesting feature of the result in this model is how the welfare effect 
depends on the response of labor to a rise in government debt serviced by the labor 
income tax. The condition that a relatively weak taste for leisure helps achieve a 
positive optimal level of government debt reflects the results in Lemma 1.1 and 
Proposition 1.5. That is, starting from below the first-best level of labor, a positive 
effect of government debt on labor would be in the direction for welfare improvement, 
other things being equal. However, if the welfare gain from the decline in fertility and 
from the rise in leisure toward their first-best levels dominates, the net welfare effect 
of government debt can be positive even when labor falls at the same time. This last 
case will be considered in the numerical simulation below.    
The numerical result in this third-best case is reported in row four of Table 1.1. 
Without education subsidy, the level of the optimal debt-output ratio with the labor 
income tax is around 2.7%, lower than the first-best and second-best debt-output 
ratios as one may expect. In particular, the fraction of income spent on the education 
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for all children is now much lower while the fertility rate is higher. The higher 
fertility rate also corresponds to less leisure than in the second-best case.  
In all the cases from the first-best to the third-best, the level of the optimal 
debt-output ratio is sensitive to the share parameter associated with the physical input 
in education,  . In Table 1.2, the value of   is raised to 0.27, yielding higher 
levels of the debt-output ratio (especially in the second and third-best cases). It is also 
sensitive to the taste parameter associated with leisure,  . In Table 1.3, when the 
value of   is raised to 0.9, the optimal debt-output ratios are lower in the 
second-best and third-best cases compared to that under the benchmark 
parameterization in Table 1.1. Also, it illustrates the fact that government debt is 
welfare-enhancing even when labor falls (in the second-best and third-best cases 
compared to the case without intervention) since the taste for leisure is relatively 
strong.  
In Figures 1.3 and 1.4 concerning the third-best case, we vary the debt-output 
ratio from 0 to 10% and find the subsequent welfare levels under 0.33  and 
0.9  respectively. It is worth nothing that the welfare level is a concave and 
smooth curve, peaking at a unique point.  
Finally, for a better gauge of the welfare gains, we report their equivalent 
consumption variations in the last column of these tables in terms of the change in 
consumption   in every period such that the benchmark case without government 
intervention reaches the same welfare level as that in a case with government 
intervention type i: 
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V V    .  
This corresponds to adding 
0
ln(1 ) [ln(1 )]/(1 )t
t
        to the welfare level 
in the no government case. According to the reported figures in this regard in these 
tables, the first-best case achieves a welfare gain equivalent to a rise in consumption 
in all periods from 3.1% in Table 1.1 to 7.25% in Table 1.2; the second-best case 
achieves a welfare gain equivalent to a rise in consumption from 2.4% in Table 1.3 to 
5.6% in Table 1.2; the third-best case makes a welfare gain less than a 0.5% rise in 
consumption. The difference in the magnitude depends sensitively on the share 
parameter in the education technology; however, the size of the welfare gain is 
substantial in the relevant second-best case with government debt and education 
subsidies financed by a labor income tax in all these tables. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how government debt serviced by either a lump-sum tax or 
a labor income tax affects allocations, fertility and welfare with or without education 
subsidies and explored the optimal level of government debt in a dynastic model. In 
doing so, we have considered endogenous fertility, altruistic bequests, human capital 
externalities and a labor-leisure choice jointly. Such a combination of these relevant 
factors is new compared to the related literature and leads to some new results, to the 
best of our knowledge. 
 We have shown that combining government debt with an education subsidy and a 
lump-sum tax can achieve the first-best outcome. We have identified the following 
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reasons. On the one hand, with the human capital externality, fertility and 
consumption relative to output are too high while leisure, labor and education 
spending relative to output are too low, compared to their social optimum. On the 
other hand, with a lump-sum tax, a rise in government debt reduces fertility and 
increases labor and leisure while the education subsidy raises education spending 
against consumption spending relative to output. 
We have also studied the second-best and third-best government debt financed by 
a realistic labor income tax, with or without education subsidies. The labor income 
tax affects fertility, leisure and labor in a direction that offsets the benefit of 
government debt, thereby tending to engender different results from Zhang (2003, 
2006) that used lump-sum taxes and did not consider leisure. Specifically, since the 
labor income tax reduces the cost of leisure and childcare, a rise in government debt 
has weaker effects on fertility and time allocation. In particular, it can reduce fertility 
when the taste for the number of children is not too strong relative to the welfare of 
children. Also, it may reduce or raise labor depending on the taste for leisure. The 
positive level of optimal government debt hinges on these conditions for government 
debt to exert a negative effect on fertility. A positive level of optimal government debt 
is also more likely to emerge when the taste for leisure is relatively weak so that 
government debt raises labor. In the above three cases, issuing government debt can 
help to internalize the positive spillovers from the average human capital to different 
extents, thereby enhancing individuals’ welfare level compared to the competitive 
solution without government intervention. The magnitudes of the welfare gains can 
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be significant for plausible parameterizations, i.e. equivalent to a 5% rise, or more, in 
consumption in all periods. Government debt can still improve welfare even when it 
reduces labor under a labor income tax. 
These results extend the welfare-improving property of government debt in the 
presence of human capital externalities in the education process in the literature to a 
more realistic model with a labor-leisure trade-off and a labor income tax. The 
results differ from the welfare-reducing or neutrality property of government debt in 
existing models without endogenous fertility. The results also enrich the 
understanding of government debt on the time allocation and fertility and may thus 
help explain the combination of falling fertility, rising labor participation of females 
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Table 1.1 Comparison of simulation results in four cases ( 0.33,  0.15  ) 
Parameterization: 0.6, 0.15, 0.93, 0.33, 0.33, 0.1, 0.412v             
             b (%)   s (%)    l (%)   e (%)    c (%)    k (%)     n        z         l           B           * (%) 
 
No intervention     0.0       0.0      0.0      7.6      72.57     19.80    3.057    0.183   0.511    3.74640        
First-best case      4.7      38.0     0.0     12.3      67.89     19.80    2.577    0.186    0.556     3.67010     3.10  
Second-best case    7.3      47.9    16.1     12.3      67.89     19.80    2.737    0.207    0.519     3.68276     2.58 
Third-best case     2.7       0.0     2.7      7.4      72.77     19.80    2.974    0.189    0.514     3.74545      0.04  
 

















Table 1.2 Comparison of simulation results in four cases ( 0.33,  0.27  ) 
Parameterization: 0.6, 0.27, 0.93, 0.33, 0.33, 0.1, 0.315v             
                  b (%)   s (%)   l (%)   e (%)    c (%)    k (%)      n        z        l           B           * (%) 
 
No intervention      0.0      0.0      0.0      12.6     67.61     19.80     2.545    0.186    0.559     4.93540     
First-best case       6.7     34.8     0.0      19.3     60.89     19.80     1.674    0.192    0.641    4.76054     7.25  
Second-best case    11.6     52.1    26.6     19.3     60.89     19.80     1.874     0.236   0.577     4.79825     5.64  
Third-best case      8.2      0.0      8.2     11.6     68.64     19.80     2.238    0.209    0.567     4.92358   0.47  
 

















Table 1.3 Comparison of simulation results in four cases ( 0.9  , 0.15  ) 
Parameterization: 0.6, 0.15, 0.93, 0.9, 0.33, 0.1, 0.412v             
                  b (%)     s (%)     l (%)    e (%)    c (%)     k (%)      n        z        l         B         * (%) 
 
No intervention      0.00        0.0       0.0      7.6       72.57      19.80     2.324    0.379    0.389   5.51853  
First-best case       4.67      38.0       0.0     12.3       67.89      19.80     1.950    0.384    0.421  5.44207   3.11  
Second-best case     4.72      46.1     13.2     12.3       67.89     19.80     2.115    0.404    0.385  5.45868   2.42  
Third-best case      2.18       0.0       2.2     7.5       72.73     19.80     2.257    0.387    0.387   5.51750    0.04  
 




Figure 1.1 Welfare with government debt, education subsidy 




Figure 1.2 Welfare with government debt, education subsidy 



















Subsidies in an Endogenous Cycle Growth Model 
 
2.1. Introduction 
One theme of macroeconomics is to explore whether and how government policies can 
promote output growth or mitigate output fluctuations for welfare gains. However, 
different macroeconomic models have different policy implications. The neoclassical 
growth model, pioneered by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), captures how capital 
accumulation contributes to growth and why growth eventually halts at a stable 
steady-state output level per capita under diminishing returns to investment. It may need 
no role of government intervention so long as consumers choose their consumption path 
optimally as in Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) according to the Welfare Theorems. 
This policy implication can remain valid even when exogenous shocks are introduced 
into the neoclassical growth model for the creation of cycles as in the real business cycle 
models led by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983). 
 The neo-Schumpeterian models in the last two decades generate sustainable growth 
through costly innovations that create new varieties of intermediate goods or improve 
the quality of existing intermediate goods (e.g. Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). 
In these R&D endogenous growth models, R&D activities intended for a new variety or 
a quality improvement incur a fixed cost, whereas the production of each intermediate 
good incurs a constant marginal cost; and both the innovation and the intermediate 
goods production use current final output. Monopoly rights are granted to innovators in 
order to allow them to recoup their innovational costs. The consequent monopoly pricing 
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reduces the demand for new intermediate goods, causing lower final output and slower 
growth than their socially optimal levels (static and dynamic losses in efficiency, 
respectively). The efficiency losses of monopoly pricing justify government 
subsidization either to R&D investment or to the purchase of newly created intermediate 
goods, as shown in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Zeng and Zhang (2007) among 
others. In contrast to the neoclassical growth and the real business cycle models, 
however, the economy is always on the balanced growth path in such 
neo-Schumpeterian growth models that are known as the AK model in essence. 
 Matsuyama (1996, 1999) unifies the neoclassical and the neo-Schumpeterian 
growth models by assuming that both R&D activities and intermediate goods production 
can only use available capital from previous savings. Under this neoclassical-style 
assumption, innovation can break even to recover the fixed cost if and only if capital per 
type of intermediate good exceeds a critical level for a profitable scale of the demand for 
newly invented intermediates. Once initial capital exceeds this level and induces 
innovation, however, part of the initial capital must be used for the fixed innovation cost 
and the remaining amount of capital for manufacturing intermediate goods declines. 
Consequently, current innovation, if responding far more sensitively than capital 
investment to initial abundance in capital per variety, can reduce capital per variety so 
much that future innovation becomes unprofitable until enough capital is formed again 
through a neoclassical investment phase. It argues that this is an empirically plausible 
scenario: The balanced growth path with innovation is unstable and therefore the 
economy may fluctuate between a Solow investment phase and a Romer innovation 
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phase perpetually, causing cyclical movements in consumption. In a different 
neo-Schumpeterian growth model by Francois and Shi (1999) where labor rather than 
capital is the sole input for innovations and for intermediate goods production, cycles 
can arise endogenously from contemporaneous complementarities between investors 
devoting labor to innovation for temporary profits.  
 The cyclical fluctuations in consumption, investment, innovation and growth 
represent another source of efficiency loss, given diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption and diminishing marginal product of factors. This adds to the efficiency 
losses of monopoly pricing analyzed in the literature, which differs from the Pareto 
optimal variations in consumption across time and sectors facing exogenous shocks 
found in Long and Plosser (1983). Therefore, important macroeconomic questions arise 
as follows. Can government policies mitigate or eliminate such cyclical fluctuations and 
promote innovation and growth at the same time? Can such government policies, if they 
exist, enhance social welfare?   
 When attempting to answer these questions, it is natural to focus on subsidization 
associated with R&D activities or with the purchase of new R&D products. Although 
such subsidization has been considered in the literature with innovation and growth as 
mentioned earlier, the existing studies have mainly focused on how the subsidies can 
mitigate the static and dynamic losses in efficiency of monopoly pricing on a stable 
balanced growth path. To the best of our knowledge, the only work on subsidization in 
the unified model so far is Aloi and Lasselle (2007), in which a lump-sum subsidy to 
innovators financed by a lump-sum tax on consumers can promote growth, stabilize the 
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innovation cycles and increase welfare. However, they essentially allow the use of 
current tax revenue to form available capital for current innovation via subsidization: 
With a balanced budget between tax revenue and subsidy spending, their subsidy takes 
the form of giving capital to innovators and adds to available capital in the resource 
constraint for innovation and intermediate goods production. Their assumption is at odds 
with the spirit of time-to-build in neoclassical capital accumulation. In the Matsuyama 
model, the constraint on available capital from previous saving for current innovation 
and intermediate goods production is a necessary assumption for the creation of cycles. 
It remains to show whether and how more realistic subsidization by taxation, that does 
not relax this assumption, can induce changes in individuals' behavior to stabilize the 
balanced growth path for welfare gains.  
 In this chapter, we explore whether flat-rate subsidization associated with the 
profitability of R&D activities can mitigate or eliminate cycles for welfare gains in the 
Matsuyama model. In doing so, the subsidy provides additional awards to innovators 
without relaxing the constraint on available capital for innovation and intermediate 
goods production. We find that subsidies to R&D investment or to the purchase of newly 
invented intermediate goods, financed by a consumption tax, can arbitrarily reduce the 
threshold level of capital per variety, beyond which the economy moves from the 
investment phase to the innovation phase. Moreover, sufficient subsidization can change 
the balanced growth path from an unstable one to a stable one and thus eventually 
eliminate the cycles. In numerical examples, such subsidies can achieve substantial 
welfare gains equivalent to as much as a 15% increase in consumption in every period; 
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the optimal subsidy rates are found indeed in the range that lead to either oscillatory or 
monotonic convergence toward the stable steady state of capital per variety, or the 
balanced growth path.  
 Our results are consistent with the postwar experiences in some industrial nations 
such as the United States where substantial subsidies are provided to R&D activities and 
to the purchase of new equipment. For example, there is substantial subsidization in the 
US tax system：a 50% immediate writing-off of equipment investment, expensing of 
R&D expenditures, and accelerated depreciation allowances, according to Gordon, 
Kalambokidis, Rohaly and Slemrod (2004), Gordon, Kalambokidis and Slemrod (2004) 
and others. At the same time these countries observe much more innovations but 
dampened recessions compared to previous times on average. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the building 
blocks of the model. Section 2.3 characterizes the steady states in different regimes and 
analyzes the global dynamics for different levels of subsidization. Section 2.4 deals with 
optimal subsidy rates and presents numerical simulation results. Section 2.5 concludes.  
 
2.2. The model 
The model is an extension from Matsuyama (1999) by considering subsidies to R&D 
spending and to the purchase of newly invented intermediate goods, financed by a 
consumption tax. Time is discrete from one to infinity. 
 
2.2.1. The structure of production and innovation 
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There is a single final good taken as a numeraire; it is produced competitively using 
capital and labor; it can either be consumed or invested. Labor is supplied inelastically at 
an amount L  that also stands for the size of the working population. Let 1tK  denote the 
capital stock saved in period t-1 starting with an initial capital stock 0 0K  ; it is used 
for the production of existing intermediates or for the innovation of new intermediates in 
period t. This means that capital takes one period to become productive in the spirit of 
time-to-build capital. Without this realistic assumption, the economy would always be 
on the unique balanced growth path as in the earlier R&D growth models.  
Capital is first converted into a composite of intermediate goods by a symmetric 
CES function. Let  tx z denotes the zth type of available intermediate good in the range 
[0, ]tN  in period t . Labor and the composite of intermediates are combined through a 
Cobb-Douglas technology for final goods production: 
    1 11 0 tNt tY A L x z dz     ,                                    (2.1) 
where 0A   is the total factor productivity parameter, and 1   is the direct partial 
elasticity of substitution between every pair of intermediate goods.  
One unit of each type of intermediate good is manufactured by converting a units of 
capital. In each period t, old intermediate goods in the range  10, tz N   starting with 
0 0N   are sold competitively, while new intermediate goods of variety  1,t tz N N  
may be introduced via innovation and sold exclusively by their innovators in period t. 
Innovating a new intermediate requires F fixed units of capital. Because all intermediate 
goods enter final goods production symmetrically, we have   ct tx z x for  10, tz N  , 
and   mt tx z x for 1,t tz N N    . Then the profit function for firms in the final goods 
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sector can be expressed as: 
      1 1 1 11 1 1c mt t t t t tA L N x N N x            
      1 11c c m mt t t x t t t t tN p x s N N p x w L      ,   0 1xs  ,            (2.2) 
where ctp  and 
m
tp  are the prices of old and new intermediate goods, respectively; 
xs is the constant subsidy rate to the purchase of new intermediate goods used in Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Zeng and Zhang (2007) but not considered in Aloi and 
Lasselle ( 2007); and tw  is the wage rate per unit of labor. According to Zeng and 
Zhang (2007), the subsidies to final output or to the purchase of intermediate goods are 
equivalent concerning their effects on growth and welfare. Thus, we only consider the 
latter. 
In the final goods sector, factors are paid by their marginal products: 
      111 1c ct tp A L x    ,                                     (2.3) 




L .                                                     (2.5) 
Let tr denote the price of capital. Then the marginal cost of manufacturing 
intermediate goods in period t is equal to tar . All old intermediate goods are supplied 
competitively at a price level equal to the marginal cost,   ct t tp z p ar   
for  10, tz N  , while all new intermediate goods, once introduced, are sold 
monopolistically at a higher price level,    [ 1 ]m ct t t tp z p ar p     , 
for 1,t tz N N    , following from (2.4). From equations (2.3) and (2.4), the relationship 
between ctx and 
m
tx  must satisfy: 
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             
.                            (2.6) 
 Absent subsidies, the higher price of new intermediates than that of old 
intermediates yields a smaller equilibrium quantity of each new intermediate than that of 
each old intermediate, . This asymmetry in the equilibrium quantities of new 
versus old intermediates must lead to static and dynamic efficiency losses. The lower 
demand for new than for old intermediate goods leads to a dynamic efficiency loss in 
terms of decelerating the rate of innovation because it reduces the profitability scale for 
innovators to recover the fixed R&D cost. At the same time, the lower demand for new 
than for old intermediate goods leads to a static efficiency loss in terms of decreasing 
final output because all intermediates enter final goods production symmetrically and 
have diminishing marginal contributions to final output.  
 Subsidies on the purchase of new intermediate goods strengthen final goods 
producers' demand for new intermediate inputs relative to old ones by reducing the user 
cost of new intermediates. According to (2.6), when 1/xs  , c mx x ; when 
1/xs  , c mx x ; when 1/xs  , c mx x . Thus, the subsidy on the purchase of new 
intermediates may affect the dynamic system significantly in this model.  
 The one period monopoly enjoyed by the innovator makes it possible to recover the 
fixed R&D cost. There is free entry for innovative activities. The monopoly profit is 
equal to the sales revenue net of the fixed R&D cost and the variable manufacturing cost: 
 1m m mt t t t t np x r ax s F       . Here, ns  is the constant subsidy rate to the fixed 
R&D cost tr F  used in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Zeng and Zhang (2007), and 
differs from the lump-sum subsidy used in Aloi and Lasselle ( 2007). The free entry 
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ensures the following in equilibrium 
       1 11 1 , , 1 1 0m mt n t t t n t tax s F N N ax s F N N             .        (2.7) 
That is, when potential innovators expect the sale of a new intermediate good to be 
smaller than the break-even point (i.e.   1 1mt nx s F a   ), there is no incentive for 
innovation, thereby 1t tN N  . In equilibrium with free entry, when innovation occurs 
(i.e. 1t tN N  ), the innovator must just break even such that ( 1)(1 )mt nax s F   . By 
lowering the cost of innovation virtually to any level, the subsidy on the R&D cost can 
reduce this break-even level of the demand for a new intermediate virtually to any level 
as well, and may therefore have significant effects on the dynamic system of the model.  
Regardless of the value of the subsidy rates, the resource constraint on the use of 
available capital for intermediate goods production and innovation in period t is: 
  1 1 1c mt t t t t tK N ax N N ax F      .                         (2.8) 
This differs from the assumption in Aloi and Lasselle (2007) that regards the subsidy as 
an addition to available capital. 
 Substituting equations (2.6) and (2.7) into the above constraint leads to 
      111 1 min , 1 1c mt x t t x nax a s x F k s s  


         ,           (2.9) 
       11 1max 0, 1 1 11tt t x n tnn






             








     ,  1,e  , 2.71828...e  . 
Clearly, for innovators to break even in period t , the initial capital stock 1tK  must be 
abundant enough relative to variety 1tN  . According to (2.9), increasing the subsidy rate 
51 
 
on the fixed R&D cost will reduce the demand for both new and old intermediates, while 
increasing the subsidy rate on purchasing new intermediates will reduce the demand for 
old intermediates, given any initial state 1 1( , )t tN K   such that 1tk   is large enough for 
innovators to break even. According to (2.10), increasing either of the two subsidy rates 
will increase the rate of innovation, given any initial state such that 1tk  is large enough 
for innovators to break even. 
We can now rewrite equation (2.1) as 
      1 1 1 11 1 1c mt t t t t tY A L N x N N x          .                     (2.11) 
Given any initial state that allows innovators to break even, the subsidies can increase 
final output by promoting innovation for faster variety expansion, but can reduce final 
output by reducing the demand for each intermediate good. However, the subsidy on the 
purchase of new intermediates can increase final output by increasing the demand for 
each new intermediate unless it is too large. To detail such effects further, we rewrite 
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           
                  
(2.12)    
 The critical value of the capital-variety ratio,    1 1c x nk s s   , below which 
there is no innovation and hence no subsidization by construction, divides government 
action in this model into policy-dormant and policy-active regions, respectively. 
Interestingly and intuitively, this threshold level of the capital-variety ratio is decreasing 
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with each of the subsidy rates xs  and .ns  In particular, increasing the rate of either 
subsidy can reduce the threshold level of the capital-variety ratio, ck , virtually to 
anywhere above zero, enhancing the chance for the economy to stay in the policy-active 
region with R&D activities. Thus, the subsidization may significantly change the 
dynamic path of the model.  
According to (2.12), given an initial state 1 1( , )t tN K  such that 1t ck k  , 
subsidizing either the fixed R&D cost or the purchase of new intermediates can increase 
final output if the subsidy rates are sufficiently low, when their positive effect on variety 
expansion dominates. The opposite occurs for further increases in the subsidy rates if the 
subsidy rates are already sufficiently high, when their negative effect on the demand for 
intermediates dominates. To see this clearly, we differentiate final output with respect to 
one subsidy rate at a time for any initial state 1 1( , )t tN K   such that 1t ck k  . Focusing 
first on how ns affects tY  at 0xs  and 1t ck k  , /t ndY ds is signed by two parts 
additively. One part with the derivative of 1 1/(1 ) / [ ( 1)]n ns s
      with respect to 
ns is signed by ns , while the other part with the derivative of 
1 1/(1 ) / [ ( 1)]n n ns s s
      is signed by 1 (2 1/ )ns   . Combining the two parts 
together, /t ndY ds  must be positive for very small ns  but becomes negative when ns  
becomes larger, at least when 1/ (2 1/ )ns   .  
When focusing on xs  at 0ns  , /t ndY ds is signed by 1 xs  through signing 
the derivative of 1(1 )x xs s
  with respect to xs . Thus, final output increases with xs  
when 1/xs   under which c mx x ; final output peaks at 1/xs  whereby c mx x : 
any further increase in xs  leads to c mx x  and thus reduces final output. Therefore, 
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given the initial state, the effects of the subsidies on final output also alter the static 
efficiency of the model. 
 Equations (2.10) and (2.12) are simplified to 
     1 11 ( , , ) max 1, 1 1 11
t
t x n t x n
t n
N k s s k s s
N s
   
             
,  (2.13) 
 1 11 1
1
( , , )t t x n t
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      , if 1t ck k  ; otherwise,            
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                        
(2.14) 
 To economize, we assume 1L  , 1a  , and 1F   without changing the essence 
of the results.  
 
2.2.2. The households’ problem and the government’s balanced budget 
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of equal size L (normalized to 
one). Agents are identical and live for two periods, working when young and living in 
retirement when old. At every period t, a new generation of workers enters the economy. 
Each worker provides one unit of labor inelastically and earns labor income tw . Part of 
the income is consumed when young, 1tC , and the rest is saved for their old-age 
consumption, 2 1tC  . We assume that the government uses a flat-rate consumption tax, 
,c t , to finance its subsidy expenditure, and runs a balanced budget in every period.  
 For tractability, the preference of young agents in generation t  is assumed as 
  1 2 11 ln lnt t tU s C s C    , 0 1s  ,                             (2.15) 
where (1-s) and s are taste parameters attached to young-age and old-age consumption, 
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respectively. The lifetime budget constraint of the representative worker is 
   1 2, , 1 1 11 1c t t c t t t tC C r w        ,                               (2.16) 
where tr  is the period t interest factor.  
In every period, young agents save optimally to maximize utility in (2.15) subject 
to (2.16), yielding a simple saving function: 
     t t tS sw s Y  .                                             (2.17) 
The model can also be extended into an infinitely lived agent framework as shown in 
Matsuyama (2001) where period-2 cycles exist with a logarithmic utility function. The 
overlapping-generations framework used here renders simplicity and makes our results 
more comparable to those in Matsuyama (1999).  
 The asset market clearing condition is 1 2 government spendingt t t tK Y C C    . 
With a balanced budget in every period, government spending on subsidization is equal 
to the tax revenue 1 2( )ct t tC C  . We can therefore rewrite the asset market clearing 
condition as: 1 2(1 ) (1 )t t ct t ct tK Y C C      . All income goes to households according 
to (1/ )t tw Y  and 1 (1 1/ )t t tS r Y   ; it is spent on life-cycle consumption in such an 
optimal way 
    







c t c t c t
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c t c t c t
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       . 
It is important to observe that a higher tax rate in this model creates a switch from 
private consumption spending to government subsidization spending as awards to 
innovation. Substituting the consumption function above into the asset market clearing 
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condition yields   
 
1 1(1 ) (1 )
.
t t t t
t




    

 
That is, investment in capital is equal to private savings in every period in this model: 
t tK S .                                                      (2.18) 
From equations (2.13), (2.14), (2.17) and (2.18), the dynamics of the economy can 
be uniquely determined by the following system of first-order difference equations in K 
and N: 
       1 1, ,t t x n tK s k s s K    ,                                    (2.19a) 
     1 1 1max 0, 1 11 1 1t t t x n tnN N K s s Ns

  
            
,       (2.19b) 
for an initial state at time 1, 0 0( , )K N , and exogenously given constant subsidy rates, 
xs  and ns . Observe that sufficient subsidization of either type can lead to the 
introduction of new intermediates, 1 0t tN N   , for any initial state at time t , 
1 1( , )t tN K  . 
With the solution for consumption, innovation and intermediate goods, the 
government's balanced budget in every period links the equilibrium tax rate to subsidy 
rates: 
      1 2, 1 11 mc t t t n t t t x t t t tC C s Fr N N s ar N N x         .          (2.20) 
In (2.20), the left-hand side is the total revenue from taxing co-existing young and old 
generations’ consumption, while the right-hand side is the total expenditure on 
subsidizing the R&D cost and the purchase of new intermediate products. When no 
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innovation occurs (i.e., 1t tN N  ), the consumption tax equals zero and accordingly the 
economy is in the policy-dormant regime. Aloi and Lasselle (2007) also assume a 
balanced budget between current subsidy spending and current tax revenue. But because 
their subsidy adds to available capital directly, they essentially allow the use of current 
tax revenue to form available capital for current innovation and intermediate goods 
production. By contrast, we do not allow current tax revenue to relax the constraint on 
available capital for innovation and intermediate goods production via subsidization. 
The justification for our assumption is that, as mentioned earlier, this constraint on 
available capital for innovation and intermediate goods production is the necessary 
assumption for endogenous cycles in the Matsuyama model to differentiate it from the 
AK-style R&D growth models without cycles. 
 Combining the consumption functions given earlier together with (2.7) and (2.10), 






111 max 0, 1 1 .
1 1
c t n x n c
c t n t
s s s ks
s k
 
     
                        
 
Using this together with (2.19b), the equilibrium tax rate can also be expressed as a 
reduced form solution given an initial state and the subsidy rates: 
     



















               
 .       (2.21) 
According to this, the equilibrium consumption tax rate is positive only when the 




2.3. The steady state and global dynamic analysis 
From equations (2.19a) and (2.19b), the law of motion for the capital variety ratio, tk , 
is governed by the following one-dimensional mapping, : R R   , 
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                      
 . 
(2.22) 
Recall that the critical value of k , below which there is no innovation, is given by 
   1 1c x nk s s   .  
The steady state of the economy is defined as an equilibrium path on which 
t t tk K N stays constant over time for any given constant subsidy rates, xs  and ns . 
According to (2.22), the steady state of the dynamic system is uniquely determined. 
Whether new intermediates are introduced or not at the steady state of capital per variety 
depends on the relationship between the steady state of k and the critical value ck . 
First, if *t ck k k   in a steady state, then according to (2.13) and (2.14), 
1t tN N  and 1t tK K  . In this steady state, there is no innovation; all the intermediate 
goods are competitively supplied; and the economy does not grow in the long run. From 
(2.19a), on this neoclassical stationary path,  *k sA  . The existence of such a 
stationary path requires that  1csA k   . 
   Now, suppose that **t ck k k  holds in a steady state. From (2.19b), the balanced 
growth path satisfies the following: 
          1 11 1, , 1 1 1 11
t t
t x n t x n
t t n
K Ns k s s k s s
K N s
    
           . 
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In this steady state, the capital stock of the economy is large enough relative to the 
number of existing intermediates such that new intermediates are introduced and that 
tK and tN  share the same growth rate. The existence of such a balanced growth path 
requires    1, , 1t x ns k s s    .  
   These results concerning the steady state of the dynamic system in (2.22) are given 
below. 
 
Proposition 2.1. Let     11 1x nG sA s s       , with 0 1xs   and 0 1ns  . 
(1) If 1G  , the dynamic system has a unique steady state * *( )k k  where 
     1 1c x nk sA k s s       . At this steady state, the economy has no 
innovation and does not grow. 
(2) If 1G  , the dynamic system has a unique steady state ** **( )k k  where
 
          1 1 1 21 1 1 1 1 1 2x n n n ck s s s sA s k                  ,  
 
         21 11 1 1 1 1 1n x n ns s s sA s                
      1 1 14 1 1 1n x n x nsA s s s s s           . 
At this steady state, the economy grows in ( , )t tN K at the same constant rate  
 
       , , 1 1 1 .1x n x nn
sg k s s k s s
s
  
           
 
Proof. The solutions for the steady state *k or **k  follow the respective scenarios in 
(2.22). What remains to show is ** ck k for 1G  . First, note the following implication 
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Note that 1 (1 1/ ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) / 0n x n x n ns s s s s s          and that 1G   
implies 1 1/( / )(1 ) (1 )(1 )n x nsA s s s
     . We can now rewrite the expression of 
below: 
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So ** 1 1/ 1/2[ 1 (1 1/ ) ( / )(1 ) ] / (2 ) 2 / (2 )c n n c ck k s sA s k k
               . The 
other root, 
** 1 1/ 1/2[ (1 ) (1 ) (1 1/ ) 1 ( / )(1 ) ] / (2 )x n n nk s s s sA s
              ,  
is dropped for being inconsistent with ck k
  . Q.E.D. 
 
The implication of Proposition 2.1 is as follows. First, whether the economy grows 
or not in the steady state depends on both the fundamentals, such as the saving rate, the 
productivity coefficient, the degree of substation between intermediate goods, and the 
subsidy rates. Other fundamentals being equal, the higher the rates of both subsidies, the 
more likely the economy moves beyond the critical ck toward the balanced growth path. 
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In fact, given * ( / )k sA  , sufficient subsidization can ensure that 
* (1 ) (1 )c x nk k s s
    , while ** (1 ) (1 )c x nk k s s     remains valid for all 
permissible rates of subsidies in the full range of [0,1) . That is, sufficient subsidization 
can rule out the neoclassical steady state in the long run and replace it by the steady state 
with balanced growth in capital and the variety of intermediates. Furthermore, the steady 
state value of k is uniquely determined in each regime with or without innovation, 
depending on the fundamentals.  
Now, we investigate the stability of the steady state by examining the asymptotic 
behavior of t t tk K N , from any arbitrary initial state 0 0 0 0k K N  . The mapping 
1( )t tk k    in equation (2.22) is continuous: It is increasing in the range of  0, ck and 
it may be increasing or decreasing in the range of  ,ck  .  
When    1 1 1t c x nk k s s     , there is no innovation in period t, that is, 
1t tN N  . In this region without innovation, all the intermediates are sold competitively 
and economic growth is led solely by capital accumulation with diminishing returns. 
Consequently, the two kinds of innovation-oriented subsidies are non-operative in this 
neoclassical growth regime without innovation.  
On the other hand, when    1 1 1t c x nk k s s     , new intermediates are 
introduced and both subsidies can be operative. Economic growth in this region is led by 
both the accumulation of capital and the innovation of new varieties of intermediates. 
Intuitively, when the growth rate of capital accumulation dominates the growth rate of 
the variety of intermediates, the resultant ratio of capital per variety t t tk K N will 
increase; conversely, it will decrease. The slope of the transition curve of 1( )t tk k    
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in this region with innovation plays a crucial role in determining the asymptotic 
behavior of tk  and thus deserves careful investigation.  
 Without the use of subsidies at 0x ns s  , the dynamics of 1( )t tk k    in (2.22) 
will become exactly the same as in Matsuyama (1999), where 1ck  , and the mapping 
for tk is always decreasing in the policy-active region with innovation. Under the 
empirically plausible conditions  in his benchmark model, period-2 
cycles are prevalent when tk alternates between the two regions forever. With the 
subsidies, it is important to ask whether the subsidies can change the slope of the 
transition equation 1( )t tk k   so as to mitigate or even eliminate the cycles. The 
answer is given below under the condition 2  , a scenario whereby period-two cycles 
emerge and persist forever without subsidization.  
 
Proposition 2.2. Suppose 2.   Define 0 /G sA  and 
    11 1x nG sA s s       with 0 , 1n xs s  . 
(1) If 1G  , then, for any given 0k R , the economy will eventually converge 
toward a neoclassical stationary path with *limt tk k   and settle down in the 
policy-dormant region. 
(2) If 1G 
 
and 1xs  , for any given 0k R , there may exist cycles forever if 
the subsidy rates are low enough; if the subsidy rates are high enough (e.g. 
( 2) / [1 ( 2)] at 0n xs s        or 1/  at 0x ns s  ), then 
1| / | 1t tdk dk    and the economy will converge toward the balanced growth path 
oscillatorily with limt tk k

   . 
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(3) If 1G   and 1xs  , for any given 0k R , the economy will converge toward 
the balanced growth path monotonically with limt tk k

  . 
 
Proof. In case (1) with * ( / ) (1 ) (1 )c x nk sA k s s
       and 1t ck k  , the slope of 
1 1/
1 1( ) ( / )t t tk k sA k
     in (2.22) is always positive, exceeding 1 at the origin 
( 1 0tk   ) and falling below 1 at the steady state ( *1 ( / )tk k sA    ) according to:  
      1/1
1






   
because  1  .  The steady state level * ck k is thus stable and the sequence 
0{ }t tk

 converges toward 
*k  for any 0k  as in the standard neoclassical growth model. 
We illustrate case (1) in Figure 1.  
 In cases (2) and (3) with * ( / ) (1 ) (1 )c x nk sA k s s
      , the slope of the 
transition equation 1( )t tk k   in (22) for 1t ck k  is derived as  




( / )(1 ) [1 (1 1/ )][1 (1 ) ]
{1 (1 1/ ) [ (1 ) (1 )]}
t n n x
t n t x n
dk sA s s s







           . 
Here, 1 (1 1/ ) 0ns    because [0,1)ns  and 1  . Also, 
1 (1 ) (1 ) 0t x nk s s

     for 1t ck k  . So the sign of 1/t tdk dk  is the same as the sign 
of 11 (1 )xs
   . Recalling 1(1 1/ ) 1     under 1  , we have: sign 
1/t tdk dk  >0 if and only if 1 1/xs    because with [0,1)xs  , 11 (1 ) 0xs      
corresponds to 1 1/xs   . Accordingly, 1/ 0t tdk dk    if and only if 
0 1/xs   under which 11 (1 ) 0xs     . Also, the absolute value of 1/t tdk dk   
is monotonically decreasing in 1tk  , and approaches zero when 1tk  approaches 




 For 1t ck k  , there are thus two possibilities with either 1/ 0t tdk dk    or 
1/ 0t tdk dk   . If 0 1/xs     and thus 1/ 0t tdk dk   beyond ck , then the 
economy may either oscillate forever with cycles or eventually converge toward the 
steady state of the balanced growth path such that **limt tk k  , depending on 
whether 1| / | 1 or 1t tdk dk    . Specifically, if the subsidy rates are low enough (say 
zero), then  1| / | 1t tdk dk    prevails under 2   and the economy behaves as in the 
original model of Matsuyama (1999) with endogenous cycles forever. If the subsidy 
rates are high enough, then we show 1| / | 1t tdk dk   for 1/ 0t tdk dk    as follows. First, 







( / )(1 ) [1 (1 1/ )][1 (1 ) ]|
{1 (1 1/ ) [ (1 ) (1 )]}t
t n n x
k k
t n x n
dk sA s s s








            
             
1 1/ 1
21 1/ 1/ 2
4( / )(1 ) [1 (1 1/ )][1 (1 ) ]
1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 ) ( / )(1 )
n n x
n x n n
sA s s s







    
        
, 
using the expression of **k  given in Proposition 2.1 for substitution.  
    For 0 1/xs   , showing **
1
1| / | 1
t
t t k k
dk dk
    is equivalent to showing  
    
 21 1/ 1/2
1 1/ 1
1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 ) ( / )(1 )
4( / )(1 ) [1 (1 1/ )][1 (1 ) ] 0
n x n n
n n x
F s s s sA s







         
      
  
whereby 11 (1 ) 0ns
    . Using the expression for  in F leads to 





[1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 ) ( / )(1 ) ]
2 [1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 ) ( / )(1 ) ]
4( / )(1 ) [1 (1 1/ )][1 (1 ) ]
2[1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 )] 2[( / )(1 )
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          
        
    





4( / )(1 ) { (1 ) [ (1 ) / ] [1 (1 1/ )]
[1 (1 ) ]} 2 [1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 )
( / )(1 ) ].
n x x n n n
x n x n
n
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      





Here, 1 1{ (1 ) [ (1 ) / ] [1 (1 1/ )][1 (1 ) ]}x x n n n xs s s s s s
              can be 
shown to be equal to [1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 )]n x ns s s
      . Thus, we can have 
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2 [1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 ) ( / )(1 ) ]
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        
      
       
        2
1/2 1 1/
]
2 [1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 ) ( / )(1 ) ].n x n ns s s sA s
    

       
 
A sufficient yet unnecessary condition for 0F  is  
 
1 1/[1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 ) ( / )(1 ) ]
[1 (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )]  (under 1)
0
n x n n
n x n x n
s s s sA s





      
         

.  
This condition is satisfied by the stated conditions on the subsidy rates: 
  ( 2) / [1 ( 2)] (0,1) under >2 at 0;n xs s          or  1/  at 0.x ns s     
Namely, if the subsidy rates are sufficiently high for 0 1/xs   , then the economy 
will eventually converge toward the steady state, or the balanced growth path. We 
depict case (2) in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. 
 For the special case without any subsidization, 0 /G G sA   and we have 
     **
1
1









     
The absolute value of this slope exceeds one (unstable **k ) if and only if 
1 1G    as in the original model of Matsuyama (1999). This condition applies 
under 2  . 
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              
          
         
    1 )ns
, 
which is strictly positive under 1G  , 0 1 and 1/ 1n xs s     . We illustrate 
case (3) in Figure 2.4. Q.E.D. 
    
According to Proposition 2.2, both types of subsidies can eventually eliminate 
cycles once their rates are set high enough such that 1| / | 1t tdk dk    under which the 
balanced growth path with innovation becomes stable. This is achieved either through 
strengthening the demand for new intermediates (via a higher xs ) or through reducing 
the innovation cost (via a higher ns ) such that R&D activities are profitable even at a 
low capital-variety ratio. By increasing varieties, the subsidization can exert different 
impacts on final output and thus on capital investment with a constant saving rate. First, 
it can directly increase final output by increasing the number of varieties according to 
equation (2.11). Second, it can indirectly reduce final output by reducing the equilibrium 
quantity of each type of intermediate input, as the subsequent increase in the total fixed 
innovation cost competes for the given amount of initial capital, except that a higher xs  
increases the equilibrium quantity of each new intermediate for 0 1/xs   .   
 It is convenient to look at how these effects work for the stability of the dynamic 
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system by using a general expression for the slope of the transition curve 
1( )t tk k   :  
 21 1 1 1/ ( / ) / [ ( / ) ( / )] /t t t t t t t t t t t tdk dk d K N dk N dK dk K dN dk N      .  











t t t t
t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t
dk dK dN k
dk dk dk N
dK dN K
dk K dk N N
dK k dN k k





    
    
    
 
The sign of 1/t tdk dk   is determined by the terms in the bracket on the right-hand 
side. It is positive (negative) if the ratio of the derivative of capital investment to the 
derivative of variety expansion with respect to the initial abundance of capital, 
1 1( / ) / ( / )t t t tdK dk dN dk  , is greater (smaller) than the resultant capital-variety ratio, 
tk . The absolute value of 1/t tdk dk   depends positively on the difference between the 
two responses, as fractions of their new stocks, 1 1[( / ) / ( / ) / ]t t t t t tdK dk K dN dk N  , 
as well as on the new capital-variety ratio, /t tK N . In the steady state with 
1t t ck k k   , both the sign and the magnitude of 1/t tdk dk   will depend solely on the 
gap in the respective elasticity of tK  and tN  with respect to 1tk  . 
 Define 0 /G sA  that serves as the growth factor in the absence of 
subsidization. If 1t ck k  , from (2.14) and (2.19a), 
1 1/
1 0 1/ (1 ) / [1 (1 1/ )] 0t t n t ndK dk G s N s
       holding 1tN  constant, while from 
(2.19b), 1 1/ / [1 (1 1/ )] 0t t t ndN dk N s      . Here, both capital investment and 
variety expansion respond positively to the initial abundance of capital per variety.  
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 Under the assumption 1 1G    , however, in the absence of subsidization the 
variety response to the initial abundance of capital is more sensitive than the 
investment response, causing instability of the balanced growth path in the original 
Matsuyama model. Without subsidization, in the steady state or on the balanced 
growth path, Proposition 2.1 and equation (2.19b) lead to 
      ** 0 0 1 0
1 1   for 1 and 0;  /x n t t
Gk G s s N N G 
       . 
So 1 1 1/ [( / ) ( / )] /t t t t t t t tdk dk dK dk k dN dk N    at the steady state **k  on the 
balanced growth path equals **
1
**
1 0 1 0/ | ( ) / (1 ) /
t
t t t tk k
dk dk G k N N G 
      , 
which is negative under 1  and smaller than 1  under 2  . In this case, 
period-two cycles prevail and persist forever.  
Subsidizing the fixed innovation cost strengthens the response of variety expansion 
to the initial abundance of capital, 1 1/ / [1 (1 1/ )] 0t t t ndN dk N s      , but weakens 
the response of investment, 1 1/1 0 1/ (1 ) / [1 (1 1/ )] 0t t n t ndK dk G s N s
       , when 
setting 0xs  . From (2.22), if this subsidy is large enough, at least for 
1/ (2 1/ ) (0,1)ns    , a further increase in ns  will also lead to lower capital per 
variety tk  as long as 1 and t c t ck k k k  , because beyond the level 
1/ (2 1/ ) (0,1)ns     the numerator of tk starts to decrease with ns . Combining 
them together, the sign of 1 1/1 0 1/ [ (1 ) ]( / ) / [1 (1 1/ )]t t n t t t ndk dk G s k N N s
         
is only determined by the factor 1 1/0[ (1 ) ]n tG s k
   whereby both terms, 
1 1/
0 (1 )nG s
 and tk , eventually decline with the subsidy rate on the innovation cost 
when the subsidy rate becomes large enough. This helps to explain why the sign of 
1/t tdk dk   remains negative for all levels of the subsidy rate in the regime with 
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innovation. The remaining factors that only determine the magnitude, not the sign, of 
1/t tdk dk  are decreasing with ns  as well: 
 11 1( / ) / [1 (1 1/ )] {1 (1 1/ ) [ (1 )]}t t n n t nN N s s k s            for 1  .  
This explains why the absolute value of 1/t tdk dk   becomes smaller when the subsidy 
rate ns  becomes larger. 
Subsidizing the purchase of new intermediates does not affect the responses of 
capital investment and variety expansion to the initial abundance of capital, when setting 
0.ns   The sign of 1/t tdk dk   is merely determined by 0[ ]tG k   which is initially 
negative when the subsidy rate is equal to zero. It follows from (2.22) that a higher 
subsidy rate for the purchase of new intermediates will reduce the amount of capital per 
variety tk  as long as 1 and t c t ck k k k  , because /t xdk ds is signed by 
1[1 (1 ) ( 1)]x x ts s k
         in which 1 (1 )x xs s     attains a negative 
maximum at 1/xs  .  Consequently, a higher subsidy rate for the purchase of new 
intermediates will reduce the absolute value of 0[ ]tG k . At **0G k   on the 





t t k k
dk dk
   . When the subsidy rate is increased further for 1/xs  , 
**
0[ ] 0G k   must hold, leading to 1/ 0t tdk dk    on the balanced growth path. Recall 
that subsidizing the purchase of new intermediates at a rate 1/xs   will lead to 
c mx x , thereby creating a loss in final output. The loss in final output, due to a higher 
xs  beyond 1/xs   will in turn lead to a decline in capital investment for a constant 
saving rate given any initial 1tk  , while variety expansion accelerates at a higher xs . 




0[ ] 0G k   and thus 1/ 0t tdk dk    at the steady state. For 0ns  , the absolute 
value of 1/t tdk dk   on the balanced growth path is derived below: 

















         . 
Therefore, the balanced growth path becomes stable once the subsidy rate on the 
purchase of new intermediates is set high enough such that **
1
1| / | 1
t
t t k k
dk dk
   . 
 
2.4. Numerical simulation of welfare comparison and optimal subsidy rates 
Since the two kinds of subsidies can promote growth and innovation and can eliminate 
cyclical fluctuations, they have potential for enhancing social welfare compared with the 
benchmark model without any government subsidization. Starting with lower final 
output and slower innovation and growth under monopoly pricing compared to their 
socially optimal levels in the Romer regime (as shown in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), 
increasing the subsidies may have different impacts on final output on the one hand and 
on innovation and growth on the other. Thus, increasing the subsidy rates can have 
opposing impacts on welfare. The positive effect of subsidies on innovation and growth 
tends to enhance welfare when the innovation rate and the growth rate are lower than 
their socially optimal levels. The effect of subsidies on final output is initially positive at 
low subsidy rates and eventually negative at sufficiently high subsidy rates, as shown 
earlier in our model. Moreover, when subsidies mitigate cyclical fluctuations in 
consumption, investment and innovation, there are possible efficiency gains due to 
diminishing marginal utility and diminishing marginal product. Thus, the overall welfare 
effect is expected to be initially positive, when the subsidy rates are low, but eventually 
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negative, when the subsidy rates become high enough.  Unlike existing studies of R&D 
subsidization that focus on the balanced growth path only, the model here allows us to 
explore whether the optimal rates of subsidies lie in the range where they eventually 
eliminate the cycles with oscillatory or monotonic convergence toward the steady state 
on the balanced growth path.  
 In this section, we will gauge the welfare gains from the subsidies and find optimal 
subsidy rates. We will do so numerically, given the complexity of carrying it out 








 ,  0 1  ,                                   (2.23) 
where 1t   is the discount factor.  
 We set a benchmark parameterization:  0.4,s  A=15, =0.6, =2.4414, =5 . 
The value of 5   is in line with that in Matsuyama (1999) where it plays dual roles: 
1 1 0.8   is the share of capital (interpreted broadly as both physical and human 
capital);  1/ 1 0.25   is the monopoly mark-up enjoyed by the innovator. Taking one 
period as 30 years, the value of the discounting factor per period at 0.6  corresponds 
to an annual discounting factor of 0.9855as in Gomme et al. (2001). It is also plausible 
to set the taste parameter for young-age consumption as 0.6 compared with that for 
old-age consumption as 0.4. The resultant equilibrium saving rate is 0.4.  
    According to Proposition 2.2, the benchmark parameterization without subsidies, 
0xs  and 0ns  , satisfies1 1G    , indicating that the economy grows through 
period-2 cycles, perpetually moving back and forth between the two regions. This is an 
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empirically plausible case as argued in Matsuyama (1999). Interesting questions in this 
numerical example are as follows: How can the subsidies affect the dynamics of this 
economy? Are there any social welfare gains from the subsidization? What are the 
possible optimal rates of these two kinds of subsidies?  
     To answer these questions, we choose the initial states as 0 0.4K   and 0 1N   
and take 1000 periods or generations into account to determine the social welfare 
approximately as in (2.23), using the first-order difference equations in (2.19a) and 
(2.19b) to update the states and t tK N  and then finding final output, consumption, the 
tax rate and utility in every period. In Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, we report the simulation 
results when increasing xs and ns  from zero to reach a peak of the welfare level, one at 
a time, respectively.  
 In Table 2.1, we set 0ns  and examine the dynamic behavior, the balanced growth 
rate, the consumption tax rate, the variety of intermediates, and the welfare level, when 
varying xs from 0 to 40%. When xs is sufficiently small (e.g., 0.01xs  , 0.02xs  ) the 
economy still alternates between the policy-dormant and the policy-active regions, and 
the social welfare is higher than the case without subsidization. When xs is increased 
further but still below 1 / 0.2  , the steady state k   becomes stable and the economy 
achieves oscillatory convergence toward it as in case 2 of Proposition 2.2. As xs is 
increased beyond 1 0.2  , the condition for case 3 in Proposition 2.2 is satisfied for 
tk to converge toward k   monotonically. For a better view of the welfare effect, in 
Figure 2.5 we vary xs from 0 to 0.8 ( 0ns  ) and find the subsequent welfare levels. It is 
worth noting that the welfare level is a concave and smooth curve, peaking at a unique 
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point when 0.22xs  , due to a balance between the various gains and losses in 
efficiency mentioned earlier.  
 Note that this optimal subsidy rate exceeds 1 / 0.2  , at which it maximizes the 
static efficiency by equalizing the user prices of old and new intermediates. Below 
1 / 0.2  , a higher subsidy rate xs yields not only a gain in static efficiency by closing 
down the price gap for new and old intermediates but also a gain in dynamic efficiency 
by promoting variety expansion. Beyond 1 / 0.2  , a further increase in xs will widen 
the price gap and cause a loss in static efficiency because now 1/xs  . However, 
increasing the subsidy rate beyond 1 / 0.2   engenders monotonic convergence 
toward the balanced growth path with innovation, thereby creating a welfare gain via 
consumption smoothing. The resultant welfare level at the optimal subsidy rate is 3.0135, 
significantly higher than that without subsidization, 2.6727. The welfare gain here is in 
terms of log utility; it will be measured again by an equivalent consumption variation 
later. 
     In Table 2.2, we fix 0xs   and focus on the effects of the subsidy on the fixed 
R&D cost, ns . Period-2 cycles persist for a relatively wide range of ns . After that, 
when it is high enough to satisfy the condition for case 2 in Proposition 2.2, period-2 
cycles are replaced by oscillatory convergence to k  in the policy-active region. In 
Figure 2.6, we vary ns  from 0 to 90% ( 0xs  ) and find the subsequent welfare level. It 
is worth noting that the welfare level is a concave and smooth curve as well, peaking at a 
unique point when * 0.70ns   that achieves oscillatory convergence toward the steady 
state with balanced growth in capital and variety. This welfare curve is flatter before 
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peaking and takes longer to reach the optimal level of the subsidy rate than in Figure 2.5, 
because this subsidy ns  does not change the price gap and therefore does not create the 
additional gain or loss in static efficiency as those created by xs  on either side of 
1/xs  . So the efficiency gain from faster variety expansion and from convergence to 
the steady state at a higher subsidy rate to the fixed R&D cost is gradually offset by a 
loss from the subsequent decline in the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate. 
Beyond this optimal subsidy rate, the welfare level declines rapidly, because the 
efficiency loss from the declined use of each intermediate is increasing at the margin. 
The resultant welfare level is 3.028, significantly higher than that without subsidization, 
2.6727. 
Finally, for a better gauge of the welfare gains, we report their equivalent 
consumption variations in the last column of the tables in terms of the percentage change 
in consumption, denoted  , for each generation such that the benchmark case without 





sU U    . 
This corresponds to adding      11 ln 1 ln 1 1tt          to the welfare level 
in the benchmark case without subsidization. According to the reported figures, the 
optimal subsidy to the purchase of new intermediates and the optimal R&D investment 
subsidy can achieve welfare gains equivalent to a rise in consumption for each 
generation of 14.60% and 15.27% respectively. Because the respective optimal rates of 
subsidies mitigate and eventually eliminate the cycles, part of the welfare gain must 
have come from smoothing consumption, which is new compared to the results in 
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existing analysis of subsidization on the balanced growth path alone. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
We have examined the implications of two types of subsidies, one type to the purchase 
of new intermediate products and the other to R&D investment, in the Matsuyama 
model of growth through endogenous cycles (1999). One contribution of doing so is that 
the subsidization can reduce the critical level of the capital-variety ratio substantially, 
enhancing the possibility for the economy to stay at the policy-active region with 
sustainable innovation and growth. Sufficient subsidization can rule out the neoclassical 
regime without innovation from the steady state in the long run 
 Another contribution is that we have characterized several possible scenarios of the 
asymptotic paths of the overlapping generation economy from any initial state 
depending on the values of the economic fundamentals and subsidy rates. In the most 
interesting yet empirically plausible scenario, sufficient subsidization leads to a stable 
balanced growth path with innovation.  
 Also, we have used a numerical example to gauge the welfare gains from the two 
types of subsidies based on an empirically plausible parameterization for a period-2 
cycle economy in the absence of subsidization. It turns out that both types of subsidies 
can help enhance the welfare level significantly in terms of a 14-15% rise in 
consumption for each generation; and the optimal subsidy rates maximizing social 
welfare are calculated in their plausible ranges that eventually eliminate cycles for 
consumption smoothing.  
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 Our results in this paper appear consistent not only with substantial subsidization to 
new investment and R&D spending but also with the combination of intensified 
innovation and dampened cyclical fluctuations in some industrial nations in the postwar 
era.  
The essence of our results may also apply to the different model of growth through 
cycles in Francois and Shi (1999) where labor is the sole input through multiple periods 
for innovation success and for intermediate goods production. They identify the 
aggregate income externality, in the form of spillovers from innovators' temporary 
profits to aggregate income and back to innovators profits, as the reason for innovation 
cycles. R&D subsidization aiming to enhance the profitability of innovation may 
therefore change the length of cycles and help internalize the spillover for welfare gains. 
A full analysis of subsidization in such an alternative setup combining the 
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Table 2.1. Results of changing the subsidy to the purchase of new intermediate goods 
 
Benchmark parameters: 0 00.4,A=15, =0.6, =2.4414, =5,K 0.4, 1, 0ns N s       
Subsidy      Mode of      Steady state k      Growth rate     Tax rate    Product variety  Welfare     
rates       convergence       ,L Hk k        (annual rate%)     (%)         1000N                (%) 
0xs       Period-2 cycle   (0.9817, 1.1824)   1.2022  (0.62)       0      4.5801*10^79    2.6727     0 
0.01xs      Period-2 cycle   (0.9414, 1.1434)   1.2123   (0.64)    (0, 0.15)   1.9946*10^83    2.6839   0.45 
0.02xs      Period-2 cycle   (0.9034, 1.1063)   1.2223  (0.67)     (0, 0.32)   7.2916*10^86    2.6987   1.05 
0.05xs      Oscillatory       0.8785         1.2556  (0.76)     0.52      4.0717*10^98    2.7393   2.70 
0.10xs      Oscillatory       0.7174         1.3098  (0.90)     1.56     9.6577*10^116    2.8337   6.65 
0.15xs      Oscillatory       0.5908         1.359   (1.03)     3.36     1.2361*10^133   2.9352   11.07 
* 0.22xs     Monotonic       0.458          1.4133  (1.16)     7.61     1.5879*10^150   3.0135   14.60 
0.25xs      Monotonic       0.4133        1.4297  (1.20)      10.2     1.6754*10^155   2.9866   13.38 
0.30xs      Monotonic      0.3509         1.4463  (1.24)      15.73    2.0583*10^160   2.8516    7.42 
0.35xs      Monotonic       0.3002        1.4497  (1.25)      22.96    2.3922*10^161   2.6179   -2.17 
0.40xs      Monotonic       0.2583        1.4408  (1.22)       32.12    5.6794*10^158  2.3047  -13.69 
 
Note: (1) The growth rate in the period-2 cycle economy is calculated as the geometric average of the 
corresponding growth rates in the two regions following Matsuyama (1999). 
(2) The values in the brackets beside growth rates indicate the discounted annual rates. 







Table 2.2. Results of changing the subsidy on the fixed R&D cost 
 
Benchmark parameters: 0 00.4,A=15, =0.6, =2.4414, =5,K 0.4, 1, 0xs N s       
Subsidy      Mode of     Steady state k      Growth rate       Tax rate    Product variety  Welfare     
rates      convergence      ,L Hk k        (annual rate%)      (%)         1000N         SU     (%) 
0ns      Period-2 cycle  (0.9817, 1.1824)   1.2022  (0.62)      0      4.5801*10^79     2.6727    0 
0.10ns   Period-2 cycle  (0.8856, 1.0889)   1.2252  (0.68)    (0, 0.33)   7.7583*10^87     2.7      1.10 
0.20ns   Period-2 cycle  (0.7902, 0.9939)   1.2505  (0.75)    (0, 0.81)   7.4146*10^96     2.7322   2.41 
0.30ns   Period-2 cycle  (0.6954, 0.8974)   1.2783  (0.82)    (0, 1.53)    2.8933*10^106   2.7804   4.40 
0.40ns     Oscillatory        0.6862       1.3094  (0.90)      1.3      7.9477*10^116   2.832    6.58 
0.50ns     Oscillatory        0.5848       1.3451  (0.99)      2.15     4.2278*10^128  2.9054    9.75 
0.60ns     Oscillatory        0.482        1.3848  (1.09)      3.53     2.0498*10^141  2.9579   12.08 
* 0.70ns     Oscillatory        0.377        1.4275  (1.19)      5.99     3.8428*10^154   3.028   15.27 
0.80ns     Oscillatory        0.2689       1.4672  (1.29)     10.99     4.122*10^166   2.9009   9.56 
0.90ns     Oscillatory       0.1542        1.4723  (1.3 )     24.44     1.982*10^168   2.0892   -20.82
 
Note: (1) The growth rate in the period-2 cycle economy is calculated as the geometric average of the 
corresponding growth rates in the two regions following Matsuyama (1999). 
(2) The values in the brackets beside growth rates indicate the discounted annual rates. 
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Figure 2.4. 1G  and 1xs   


























Labor Variation over Endogenous Cycles of Romer and Solow Regimes 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Understanding cyclical fluctuations in employment has been a central topic in 
macroeconomics.2 Early Keynesian economists linked it to aggregate demand in 
general and to volatile investment spending in particular. Philips (1958) revealed an 
inverse relationship between money wage changes and unemployment in the British 
data. Samuelson and Solow (1960) took it further and made an explicit linkage 
between inflation and unemployment: when inflation was high, unemployment was 
low, and vice-versa. 
More recently, the seminal papers by Kydland and Prescott (1982, 1988) spur the 
interest in integrating exogenous stochastic technology shocks into the neoclassical 
growth model and examining the correlation among aggregate consumption, 
investment, working hours and aggregate output. Their model turned out to be a 
surprising success in fitting US data, except predicting a smaller than observed labor 
variation. To improve the prediction of labor variation, Hansen (1985) and Rogerson 
(1988) have incorporated labor indivisibilities. In their models, individuals are 
constrained each period to work either some fixed number of hours or not at all. 
Hence, fluctuations in aggregate working hours are due to the variation in the number 
of workers employed rather than the hours worked per worker. This feature enables 
                                                              




the economy to exhibit larger fluctuations in aggregate working hours relative to 
productivity than what is observed. Carrying Hansen’s framework forward to allow 
for adjustment along both the extensive margin and the intensive margin, Kydland and 
Prescott (1991) established a computable general equilibrium structure to confront the 
data better.  
Another line of the literature is through endogenous fluctuations: it attributes the 
nature of the instabilities to the pursuit of temporary monopoly rents by innovators; 
see, e.g., Shleifer (1986), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), and Matsuyama 
(1999, 2001). For example, according to the study of Deneckere and Judd, in a model 
with no exogenous disturbances, random or deterministic, complicated dynamics may 
arise even when preferences are CES, agents don’t discount future and there is no 
physical capital accumulation. By considering leisure goods consumption, their model 
also indicates that investment and consumption are negatively correlated with labor 
supply and output. Furthermore, Shleifer (1986) studies a multi-sector economy in 
which firms in different sectors make innovations at different times but implement 
them simultaneously to reap the highest possible pure profits during a general boom 
(when aggregate demand is highest). Focusing on the role of expectations and on 
coordination, he argues that the economy exhibits multiple cyclical equilibria, with 
entrepreneurs’ expectations determining which equilibrium can be fulfilled. However, 
investment for physical capital accumulation, a key variable for aggregate fluctuation, 
is essentially absent from this model. 
Matsuyama (1999, 2001) constructed an endogenous cycle growth model by 
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combining the neoclassical and neo-Schumpetarian growth models into a unified 
framework whereby both innovations and intermediate goods production cost initial 
capital carried over from previous savings. In his model, capital is taken as a 
composite aggregated from a variety of differentiated intermediate products as in 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and the economy achieves sustainable growth through both 
capital accumulation and innovation. Also, theoretically and numerically, it is 
demonstrated that it is empirically plausible for the economy to grow by moving back 
and forth between the investment-led growth regime and the innovation-led growth 
regime. The plausible parameterization for this period-two cycles requires innovations 
are more responsive than capital accumulation to an increase in the initial abundance 
of capital relative to varieties of available intermediate goods. Consequently, once the 
ratio of capital to varieties exceeds a critical value such that innovations can break 
even, it falls below the critical value next period. However, since it assumes inelastic 
labor, it cannot capture the labor variation over the two phases of cycles. 
In this chapter we extend the model of Matsuyama (1999) to consider a 
leisure-labor trade-off in preferences and use the extended model to explore its 
implication for equilibrium labor over cyclical movements between Romer and Solow 
regimes. We conduct this investigation based on the quasi-linear preference in 
consumption and labor as in Greenwood et al. (1988) where labor is determined 
independently of the intertemporal consumption savings choice. However, in their model 
there is no long-run growth. Once growth is sustainable in the long run with the 
preference used in their model, the ever increasing wage would accompany a deceasing 
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trend of leisure until leisure falls to zero. To eliminate the trend in leisure or labor in a 
growing economy, we use per capita capital stock as an index to adjust the marginal 
utility of leisure (disutility of labor).That is, the wealthier the workers, the greater the 
value of leisure at the margin. Our assumption is similar to but different from the 
assumption in Blackburn and Varvarigos (2008) that use human capital to adjust the 
disutility of labor at the margin. With our assumption, equilibrium labor does not 
respond to long run growth in capital and the variety of intermediate goods but it does 
respond to the ratio of capital to the variety of intermediate goods in regimes with or 
without innovations. In the Solow regime without innovation, capital accumulation 
contributes to final output or wage at a diminishing rate but affects the marginal 
disutility of labor proportionately, leading to a negative relation between labor and 
capital per variety. In the Romer regime, innovations overcome the diminishing return of 
capital and thus the wage rate becomes proportional to capital like the marginal disutility 
of labor, leading to a situation whereby labor becomes independent of capital. 
Qualitatively and quantitatively, we shall show that, along the period-2 cycles, 
equilibrium labor is higher in the Solow regime (without innovation) than that in the 
Romer regime (with innovation). Both the final output and the investment in capital 
grow faster in the Solow regime than in the Romer regime. This result is consistent with 
the empirical fact that the employment is positively correlated with aggregate real output, 
consumption and fixed investment in US (Hodrick and Prescott, 1980). 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the building 
blocks of the model. Section 3.3 characterizes the steady states in different regimes, 
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analyzes the global dynamics and explores the period-2 cycle scenario in detail. Section 
3.4 gauges the magnitudes of equilibrium labor variation in a period-2 cycle economy 
and presents numerical simulation results. Section 3.5 concludes.  
 
3.2 The basic model 
The model is an extension of the endogenous-cycles growth model with variety 
expansion in Matsuyama (1999) by considering a labor-leisure choice in agents’ 
preferences. We aim to capture the equilibrium labor variations across the two 
regimes. 
 
3.2.1 The structure of production  
The time is discrete and extends from one to infinity:  1, 2,3,t T   . There is a 
single final good, which is produced competitively. The final good, taken as a 
numeraire, can either be consumed or invested. Let tK denote the capital stock at the 
end of period t, i.e., the amount of the final good left unconsumed in period t, and 
carried over to period t+1. This means that capital takes one-period to become 
productive and, accordingly, the amount of capital stock available for use in period t is 
denoted by 1tK  . The economy inherits a positive amount of capital stock, 0 0K  , in 
the first period. 
 There are two primary factors of production: capital (K) and labor (Ll). Labor 
goes directly into the production of the final good, and the labor supply is elastic in 
the sense that each young agent allocates l units of labor in each period. Let L denote 
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the total mass of labor force in this economy. Capital is first converted into a variety 
of differentiated intermediate products. These intermediates are aggregated into the 
composite by symmetric CES. Labor and the composite of intermediates are 
combined with a constant-return-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology for final 
production: 
      1 11 0 ,tNt t tY A Ll x z dz                                      (3.1) 
where  tx z is the amount of variety z employed in period t, 1   is the direct 
partial elasticity of substitution between every pair of intermediate goods, and the 
upper limit tN  indicates the range of differentiated intermediates available in the 
market in period t. Hence, in this model, technological progress shows up as an 
expansion of varieties of intermediate goods as in Romer (1987, 1990).3 
For the intermediate goods production sector, the innovators can only enjoy 
one-period monopoly power. Prior to period t, the economy had developed 
intermediate inputs in the range, 10, tN  , with 0 0N  . These “old” intermediates are 
manufactured by converting one unit of capital into one unit of an intermediate good, 
and sold competitively in period t. In addition, the intermediate inputs of variety 
1,t tz N N     may be introduced and sold exclusively by their innovators in period t. 
These “new” intermediate inputs require F units of capital per new variety to be 
introduced. The process of manufacturing each new intermediate, like the old ones, 
requires one unit of capital.   
Let tr  denote the rental rate of capital. Then the marginal cost of manufacturing 
                                                              
3 In this sense, a new type of intermediate good is neither a direct substitute nor a direct complement with 
the types that already exist. 
89 
 
intermediates in period t is equal to tr . The old ones are supplied competitively at the 
marginal cost;   ct t tp z p r   for  10, tz N  . All the new intermediates, if they 
exist, are sold at    1mt t tp z p r    , for 1,t tz N N    . That is, the monopoly 
innovators set a constant mark up on the marginal cost in order to maximize its profit. 
Since in equilibrium all the intermediate goods enter symmetrically in the production 
function of the final goods, we have   ct tx z x for  10, tz N  , and   mt tx z x for 
1,t tz N N    . Then the profit function for firms in the final sector is expressed as:  
    
      
 
1 1 1 11
1 1 1
1 .
c m c c
t t t t t t t t t t
m m
t t t t t t
A Ll N x N N x N p x
N N p x w Ll
   
  

        
            (3.2) 
 
In the final sector, factors are paid by their marginal products: 
          111 1 ,c ct t tp A Ll x                                       (3.3) 
          111 1 ,m mt t tp A Ll x                                      (3.4) 




Ll                    (3.5) 
Hence, the relationship between ctx and 
m
tx satisfies: 










           
                (3.6) 
The one-period monopoly enjoyed by the innovator provides an incentive for 
innovation, and there is no barrier to entry for innovative activities. The period t 
monopoly profit, net of the fixed cost, is  m m mt t t t tp x r x F    . Thus, the free entry 
ensures that, in equilibrium, 
          1 11 , , 1 0m mt t t t t tx F N N x F N N           .          (3.7) 
That is, when potential innovators expect the sale of a new intermediate good to be 
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smaller than the break-even point (i.e.   1mtx F  ), there is no incentive for 
innovation, thereby 1t tN N  . In equilibrium with free entry, when innovation occurs 
(i.e. 1t tN N  ), the innovator must just break even such that ( 1)mtx F  . 
The resource constraint on capital in period t is expressed as: 
       1 1 1c mt t t t t tK N x N N x F      .                              (3.8) 
Here, 1tK  represents the amount of capital carried over from t-1, and becoming 
available for use in period t.  
 Using equations (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8), the above constraint becomes 
     
   11 1 min ,1c mt t tx x F k     ,                           (3.9) 
     
 1 1 1max 0,t t t tN N K F N      ,                            (3.10) 
where 









     ,  1,e  , 2.71828...e  . 
 We can now rewrite equation (3.1) as  
     
      1 1 1 11 1 1c mt t t t t t tY A Ll N x N N x          ,                  (3.11) 
which can further be written as, by using equations (3.9) and (3.10), 
        1 1 11 1t t t tY A Ll N K   , if 1 1tk   ; 









     , If 1 1tk   .                                (3.12) 
To economize on notations, we assume 1L   and 1F   without changing the 
essence of the results.  
According to (3.10), the critical level of k (capital stock per variety of 
intermediate goods), below which there is no innovation, is now 1ck  . Equations 
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(3.10) and (3.12) are simplified to 
  
    1 1 1max 1,1 1t t t tN N k k       ,                      (3.13)     
  
    11 11 1 1max ,1t t t t t tY K Al k Al k     .                       (3.14)  
According to (3.13), innovations halt if initial capital per variety is below its critical 
level 1 1tk   but innovations occur if initial capital per variety is above its critical level 
1 1tk   . As in Matsuyama (1999), the reason for this observation is that a minimum 
amount of capital per variety is at least required to allow the demand for new 
intermediate goods to reach the minimum level for innovations to break even as can be 
seen in (3.7) and (3.9). Interestingly, final output has a different relationship with initial 
capital with or without innovations in (3.12), holding labor constant. Specifically, final 
output in (3.12) is increasing in initial capital stock at a diminishing rate if 1 1tk    as in 
a neoclassical growth model with diminishing marginal products of factors. However, 
final output is proportional to initial capital stock if 1 1tk    as in an endogenous growth 
model where innovations eliminate diminishing returns. This observation will be helpful 
to understand cyclical movements of equilibrium labor later. 
 
3.2.2 The households’ problem  
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of the equal size, 
L (normalized to one). Agents are identical and live for two periods, working when 
young and living in retirement when old. In every period, a new generation of workers 
enters the economy, supplying tl units of labor efforts elastically and earns labor 
income t tw l . Part of the income is consumed when they are young, 1tC , and the rest is 
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saved for their old age consumption, 2 1tC  . Their preferences are given by 
     
1
1
1 2 1ln ln1
t t t
t t






     
, 0  , 0,   0 1  ,        (3.15) 
where  is the taste parameter measuring the disutility of labor, 1   is the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply,  is the discount factor. One 
important feature of the utility function is its quasi-linearity in consumption and labor 
as in Greenwood et al. (1988) where labor is determined independently of the 
intertemporal consumption savings choice. However, the original preference in their 
model would lead to a declining trend in leisure until it becomes zero when wage 
rates grow in the long run. In order to avoid a falling trend in leisure in the 
endogenous growth model in the current paper with increasing wage rates, we use per 
capita capital stock, 1tK L , as an index to adjust the degree of disutility of labor. 
Though some studies have similar considerations, they have a different way to adjust 
leisure or the utility from lesiure. 4  Our additional assumption is intuitive: the 
wealthier the workers, the greater the value of leisure at the marginal or the greater the 
marginal disutility of labor. Our new assumption of the preference makes it possible 
to analyze the global dynamics of the economy explicitly in a way that links labor 
efforts in each period directly and solely to the contemporary capital-variety ratio. 
 Young agents choose their savings tS  and provide labor efforts optimally. Their 
budget constraints are  
                                                              
4 Our assumption is similar but different from the existing quality adjustment of leisure that usually uses 
wages or human capital; for example, in Jorgenson and Slesnick (2008)’s empirical study of consumption 
and labor supply in the United States, it measures the quality-adjusted household leisure by the earnings of 
an individual, wage per efficiency unit and observed hours of work; in Blackburn and Varvarigos (2008) 
with endogenous growth, the preference is similar to that in Greenwood et al. (1988) but human capital is 
used instead of wealth.  
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     1t t t tC S w l  ,                                               (3.16) 
  2 1 1t t tC S r  ,                                                 (3.17) 
where tr  is the period t interest factor. The subsequent first order conditions are derived 
as follows: 




t t t t
r






    ,                            (3.18) 
 1t t tw K L l .                                             (3.19) 
Equation (3.18) is a standard optimality condition governing a young worker’s 
saving-consumption decision. Equation (3.19) equates the marginal product of labor 
(the wage rate) to the marginal disutility of working, with the latter adjusted by the 
initial (per capita) capital 1tK L . This condition provides a positive link between 
labor efforts and the wage rate and a negative link between labor and the initial (per 
capita) capital. 
With equations (3.5), (3.16), (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19), the period t optimal saving 
rule can be derived as 
   1 1t tS Y        .                                  (3.20) 
Together with (3.14), given 1tk  , equilibrium labor as a function of initial capital 
per variety,  1t tl k  , is determined as: 
       1 1 11 1t t tl k A k          .                              (3.21) 
The key feature of the equilibrium labor here is that in each period it depends solely 
on the initially given capital-variety ratio in that period which may fluctuate over time 
under plausible conditions.  
The asset market equilibrium condition is  
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  t tK S .                                                     (3.22) 
From equations (3.13), (3.14), (3.20) and (3.22), the dynamics of the economy can 
be entirely determined by the following system of first-order difference equations in K 
and N: 
       11 1 11 1t t t t tK Al k k K           ,                (3.23a) 
  1 1 1max 0,t t t tN N K N     ,                             (3.23b) 
for an initial state at time 1, 0 0( , )K N , where  1t tl k  is determined from equation 
(3.21). 
       
3.3 Equilibrium and results 
From equations (3.23a) and (3.23b), the law of motion for the capital variety ratio, tk , 
is governed by the following one-dimensional mapping, : R R   , 
       











k k if k
   
 




          
.                 (3.24) 
where           1 1 1 1 1 11 1 A                          . It maps the 
currently given capital variety ratio into distinct values for the next period, depending 
on whether the current capital-variety ratio exceeds its critical level as in the original 
paper of Matsuyama (1999). Here, the growth rate of the capital-variety ratio  
increases with the discount factor   and the total factor productivity A . But   
decreases with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply1  , the taste 
for disutility of labor  and the partial elasticity of substitution between every pair of 
intermediate goods . 
 The equilibrium labor function then maps the currently given capital-variety ratio in 
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each period in (3.24) into distinctive values of labor, depending on whether the currently 
given capital-variety ratio exceeds its critical level:  
    
     
   
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1







A k if k
l k
A if k








       
,             (3.25) 
This result is new and deserves some remarks as follows. When the economy falls 
into the Solow regime without innovation ( 1 1tk   ), the equilibrium labor depends 
negatively with the currently given capital stock per variety of intermediate goods. By 
contrast, when the economy falls into the Romer regime with sustainable growth and 
innovation ( 1 1tk   ), the equilibrium labor becomes independent of the capital-variety 
ratio. This is because in the investment-led neoclassical growth regime without 
innovation, capital accumulation contributes to final goods production or to the wage 
rate at a diminishing rate on the one hand, but the marginal disutility of working is 
proportional to capital stock in (3.19). By contrast, in the innovation-led growth 
regime, both the marginal benefit (the wage rate) and marginal cost of labor efforts 
are proportional to aggregate capital stock, their effects cancel out exactly in 
determining equilibrium labor. Recall our earlier discussion of the different 
relationships between the wage rate and capital in the different regimes at the end of 
Section 3.2.1. Moreover, a comparison of the levels of equilibrium labor with the 
capital-variety ratio standing either below or above its critical level leads to the 
following key result in our paper: 
 
Proposition 3.1. The equilibrium level of labor is greater in the Solow regime without 
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innovations than that in the Romer regime with innovations. 
 
Proof. The proof follows equation (3.25): the level of equilibrium labor differs only by a 
factor 1/[ (1 ) 1] 1/[ (1 ) 1]1 1 1( ) 1/ ( ) 1 for 1 since [ (1 ) 1] 0t t tk k k
                 . Q.E.D. 
 
3.3.1 The steady states 
We now look at the steady state of this economy, which is defined as an equilibrium path 
on which t t tk K N  and tl  stay constant over time for any given initial state in 
period 1. According to (3.24) and (3.25), the steady state of the dynamic system is 
uniquely determined. 
First, if * 1tk k   in a steady state, then according to (3.13) and (3.14), 
1t tN N  and 1t tK K  . In this steady state, there is no innovation; all the intermediate 
goods are competitively supplied; and the economy does not grow. From (3.24) and 
(3.25), on this neoclassical stationary path, 
            1 1 11 1 1 1 1, ,k l A                 . The existence of such a stationary path 
requires that  1  . 
Now, suppose that ** 1tk k  holds in a steady state. From (3.13), the balanced 
growth path satisfies  1 1 1 1 1t t t tK K N N k       . In this steady state, the 
capital stock of the economy is large enough relative to the number of existing 
intermediates such that new intermediates are introduced and that tK and tN  share the 
same growth rate. From (3.24) and (3.25), on this balanced growth path, 
        1 1 1, 1 1 ,k l A           . So  1 1 1 1t t t tK K N N k       , 
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namely that   is the gross rate of growth. The existence of such a balanced growth 
path requires that  1  . 
These results concerning the steady state of the dynamic system in (3.24) and 
(3.25) are summarized below. 
 
Proposition 3.2. Define the gross rate of growth 
by           1 1 1 1 1 11 1 A                          . 
(1) If 1  , the dynamic system has a unique steady state * *( )k k  where 
            1 1 11 1 1 1 1, ,k l A                 . At this steady state, the 
economy has no innovation and does not grow. 
(2) If 1  , the dynamic system has a unique steady state 
** **( )k k where         1 1 1, 1 1 ,k l A           . At this steady 
state, there is balanced growth in ( , )t tN K at the rate 
 1 1 1 1t t t tK K N N k       . 
 
3.3.2 The global dynamics 
This subsection investigates the stability of the steady state by examining the 
asymptotic behavior of tk  and tl , from any arbitrary initial state 0 0 0 0k K N  . 
The mapping 1( )t tk k    in equation (3.24) is continuous: It is increasing in the 
range of  0,1 and it is decreasing in the range of  1, . The corresponding 
equilibrium labor depends negatively on the currently given capital-variety ratio in the 
Solow growth regime for 1 1tk   , and becomes independent of the capital-variety 
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ratio in the Romer growth regime for 1 1tk   . 
When  1 1tk   , there is no innovation in period t, that is, 1t tN N  . In this region 
without innovation, all the intermediates are sold competitively and economic growth is 
led solely by capital accumulation with diminishing returns. The equilibrium labor 
depends negatively on the capital-variety ratio, because the marginal disutility of labor is 
proportional to the capital stock (equivalent to the capital-variety ratio without 
innovation) and because the return to labor (the wage rate) is increasing with the capital 
stock at a diminishing rate. 
On the other hand, when 1 1tk   , new intermediates are introduced. Economic 
growth in this region is led by both the accumulation of capital and the innovation of 
new varieties of intermediates. From (3.12), the aggregate output is now proportional to 
capital stock as in a typical A-K endogenous growth model. Therefore, both the marginal 
product of labor (the wage rate) and the marginal disutility of labor are proportional to 
capital stock. When the representative young worker makes the labor-leisure choice 
according to the optimality condition in (3.19), the effects of capital on the marginal 
benefit and the marginal cost of labor cancel out each other, leaving equilibrium labor 
being independent of the capital-variety ratio for 1 1tk   .  
In fact, with the redefined growth potential,  , the global dynamics of the 
economy behaves exactly in the same way as that in Matsuyama (1999). 
When 1  holds,  ,k l  is stationary. For any initial condition in this case, the 
economy is trapped into the Solow regime, after at most one period, innovation stops. In 
other words, the economy converges monotonically to the stationary state.  
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On the other hand, when 1  holds, or equivalently,  c ck k  , there is 
balanced growth in capital and variety at the steady state  ,k l  . Thus, there are two 
scenarios that differ in the local stability of the steady state, determined by the slope of 
the mapping at the steady state, k  ,  **
1
1 | 1 0
t
t t k k
dk dk  
     . When 1 1    , 
the absolute value of  **
1
1 | 1 0
t
t t k k
dk dk  
      exceeds one and thus the steady 
state is locally unstable. Starting with a small 0k , the economy may stay in the Solow 
regime for some periods, but it will eventually accumulate large enough capital for 
innovations to break even and thus enter the Romer regime. In this case, the economy 
achieves sustainable growth through cycles, by bouncing back and forth between the 
two regimes.  
When 1   holds, the absolute value of  **
1
1 | 1 0
t
t t k k
dk dk  
     is less 
than one and thus the steady state is globally stable. Starting with a small 0k , the 
economy may stay in the Solow regime for some periods, but it will eventually enter the 
Romer regime and stay there forever. It oscillates around and eventually converges to 
the balanced growth path. The following proposition sums up our analysis of the three 
distinct asymptotic paths: 
 
Proposition 3.3. Define the gross rate of growth by 
          1 1 1 1 1 11 1 A                           and suppose that 
2.   
(1) If 1  , then, for any given 0k R , 
  ; [0, ) 0,t ck t k   and *limt tk k   , *limt tl l  . That is the economy 
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will eventually converge toward a neoclassical stationary path and settle down in 
this region. 
(2) If 1 1    , there are period-2 cycles;  1,t tk l fluctuates forever between 
the Solow regime  ,S Sk l  and the Romer regime  ,R Rk l  with 
 and S R S Rk k l l  . That is, the economy almost surely moves back and forth 
between the two regimes.  
(3) If 1   , for any given 0k R there exists a [0, )t  such that 
   ; ,t c ck t t k k      and limt tk k   , limt tl l  . That is, the 
economy eventually settles down in the Romer regime, and then oscillates around 
and eventually converges to a balanced growth path. 
 
Proof. To show case (1), we differentiate the transition equation in (3.24) for 1 1tk   :  
     (1 )/[ (1 ) 1)]1/ {[(1 )( 1) 1] / [ (1 ) 1]}t t tdk dk k
                    
where [(1 )( 1) 1]    >0 under 2 (hence 2)   and 0  . Note that 
1/t tdk dk  is greater than 1 at a very small 1tk  but smaller than 1 at the steady state 
*k : 
       *
* (1 )/[ (1 ) 1)]
1/ | {[(1 )( 1) 1] / [ (1 ) 1]} ( )
{[(1 )( 1) 1] / [ (1 ) 1]} (0,1) for 2 or 2.
t t k k
dk dk k       
     
   
       
           
 This completes part (1). 
 In case (2), when the economy alternates perpetually between the Solow regime 
 ,S Sk l and the Romer regime  ,R Rk l , the equilibrium labor is determined 
as        1 1 11 1 1S Sl A k              and    1 1 1Rl A        according to equation 
(3.25). With 0 1S Rk k   , 0  and 1  , S Rl l as claimed in Proposition 1. The 
remaining claims for cases (2) and (3) have been given in our earlier analyses and 
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discussions in the main text. Q.E.D.                 
 
Proposition 3.3 states that the global dynamics of the economy behaves in exactly 
the same way as Matsuyama (1999). By adding a labor-leisure trade-off in agents’ 
preferences and treating young-age consumption and labor quasi-linearly, we are able to 
generate equilibrium labor fluctuations when the economy alternates between the Solow 
regime and the Romer regime perpetually given the plausible parameterization 
1 1     for period-2 cycles. The equilibrium level of labor is higher in the Solow 
regime (without innovation) than that in the Romer regime (with innovation). The 
intuition is that when the disutility of labor is proportional to the capital stock (per 
capita), it does not respond to the long-run trend in the wage rate that shares the growth 
rate with capital in the long run. However, it does respond to the variation in the 
capital-variety ratio in different regimes of cycles because the wage rate is proportional 
to the capital stock in the Romer regime but less than proportional to capital in the 
Solow regime (due to diminishing returns absebt innovations).   
 
3.3.3. Peroid-2 cycles 
To achieve a better understanding of the cyclical dynamics, especially the relationship 
between labor variation and the movements of the other main macroeconomic 
variables over cycles, in this subsection, we will focus on the scenario of period-2 
cycles when1 1     . In this scenario, the economy alternates forever between 
the Solow regime,  ,S Sk l and the Romer regime  ,R Rk l , where Sk and Rk are 
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determined jointly by 
        1 1 1 1 1R S Sk k k                  ,                          (3.26a) 
        1 1S R R Rk k k k        .                             (3.26b) 
     We will consider how the growth rate of the key variables, such as the 
innovation rate, N, the capital stock, K, and the final output, Y, change over cycles. 
Assume that the economy is in the Solow regime in period t along the period-2 
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      
.                         (3.27b) 
From (3.21), 








     





       .                  (3.27c) 
From (3.14), we also have 
 
          
1
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          
 
   .            (3.27d) 
Plugging equations (3.26a) and (3.26b) into equations (3.27a) to (3.27d), one can 
verify that, in the Solow regime we have,  
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     1 1 11S S S SN K Yg g g k               , 
and, in the Romer regime we have 
      1 1R R R RN K Yg k g g       , 
where the superscript S (R) distinguishes the regimes and the subscript X denotes the 
(gross) growth rate of variable X. We state these results formally in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 3.4 Suppose that1 1    . Along the period-2 cycles, equilibrium 
labor in the expansionary Solow regime (without innovation) is qualitatively higher 
than that in the Romer regime (with innovation), when both the aggregate output and 
investment achieve a higher growth rate in the former regime. That is, both labor and 
investment are procyclical.  
 The result in Proposition 3.4 is consistently with the observed correlations of 
employment, investment and GDP. 
 
3.4. Numerical simulation of labor variation over period-2 cycles 
To compare equilibrium labor in the Solow regime and the Romer regime over 
period-2 cycles quantitatively, we now use a numerical example. A benchmark 
parameterization is set as: 40, 0.6, 5, 2.4414, 0.25, 0.2A           . The 
value of   is in the relevant range as Matsuyama (1999) where it plays a dual role: 
1 1  is the share of capital (capital is interpreted broadly as including both physical 
and human capital);  is also the direct partial elasticity of substitution between 
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every pair of intermediate goods. Thus, the share of broadly defined capital is 
4 5 compared to that of raw labor. Taking each period as 30 years, the value of the 
discounting factor per period at 0.6  corresponds to an annual discounting factor 
of 0.9855 as in Gomme et al. (2001). The value of A=40 is chosen to 
satisfy1 1    , the condition for the period-2 cycle to emerge.  
In Table 3.1, we report the simulation results of the period-2 cycle economy and 
measure the percentage variation of equilibrium labor supply  %l  over cycles. In 
the last two columns, to capture the positive correlation between labor variation and 
the growth rates of aggregate real output and investment numerically, we also 
calculate the gross growth rate of investment (output) when the economy falls into the 
Solow and Romer regimes respectively. The robustness of the result has been checked 
by adjusting key parameters around its benchmark values.5 
Across all sets of parameterizations, both output and investment grow faster in 
the Solow regime (the period with no innovation) than in the Romer regime (the 
period with innovations) along the period-2 cycles. Equilibrium labor is higher in the 
Solow regime than in the Romer regime along the cycles. For example, by setting a 
higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply, where 0.15  , we are 
able to generate a larger magnitude of labor variation of 0.40% compared with the 
result of 0.36% from benchmark parameterization, whereas it falls to 0.33% by 
assuming a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply, 
where 0.35  . 
                                                              
5 When alternative parameterization is used, the value for total factor productivity A has been adjusted accordingly 





This chapter has explored how equilibrium labor fluctuates when the economy 
alternates between the investment-led growth (Solow) regime and the innovation-led 
growth (Romer) regime. This extension with a labor-leisure trade-off in preferences 
within endogenous cycle framework allows us to answer a fundamental question in 
the business cycle theory: Should equilibrium labor be higher or lower in different 
phases of the growth process and how should it be correlated with other key economic 
variables? 
We have answered this question by treating young-age consumption and 
young-age labor quasi-linearly in preferences and by choosing capital stock (per 
capita) to adjust the disutility of labor at the margin. We find that period-2 cycles 
emerge under the same condition as in the original model of Mastuyama (1999) 
without the labor-leisure trade-off. Our new contribution is that the implied behavior 
of equilibrium labor is consistent with available observations. We have shown that the 
equilibrium level of labor has no rising or falling trend in the long run in our model. 
However, the equilibrium level of labor changes over different phases of cycles. It is 
higher in the expansionary Solow regime, where aggregate output and investment 
grow faster, than in the Romer regime. This result is consistent with the empirical fact 
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Table3.1 Simulated period-2 cycles when 1 1   
 
 
  Benchmark parameters: 40, 0.6, 5, 2.4414, 0.25, 0.2A            
                 ,S Sk l               ,R Rk l            %l          ,SK Yg          ,RK Yg   
Benchmark parameterization 
                              (0.9814, 33.6764)      (1.1942, 33.5561)       0.36           1.2168       1.2114  
Alternative parameterizations 
0.15   ( 53A  )             (0.9813, 65.5776)       (1.179, 65.3172)        0.40           1.2015       1.196 
0.35   ( 33A  )             (0.9815, 20.9825)       (1.162, 20.9145)        0.33           1.1839       1.1787 
0.1    ( 36A  )            (0.9815, 58.9432)       (1.2022, 58.7338)       0.36           1.2249       1.2194 
0.3    ( 42A  )            (0.9813, 23.9775)       (1.1715, 23.8916)       0.36           1.1938       1.1884 
4   ( 2.3704  , 26A  )    (0.9855, 32.6192)       (1.1523, 32.5)          0.37           1.1693       1.1640 
6   ( 2.4883  , 55A  )    (0.9787, 34.2641)       (1.217, 34.1506)        0.33           1.2435       1.2384 




Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1 
A.1 Derivation of the welfare function 
Substituting the solution in (1.16)-(1.22) into (1.3) and (1.8) provides the 
evolutions of physical and human capital per worker as below 
  11t t tk D k n
    ,                                             (A.1) 
     1 1t e t th A n D vn z h       .                               (A.2) 
Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) determine the evolution of the physical capital-effective labor 
ratio: 
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   
 
       
,                                (A.3) 
where t  is globally convergent to its long-run level   because  0 1 1    . 
 Let  1    . Taking logs on (A.2) and (A.3), we solve the resultant log-linear 
first-order difference equations as: 
  0ln 1 ln lnt tt     ,                                     (A.4) 
     
0 0







h t AD n vn z t
h
    
 

             
    
    (A.5) 
with    0 0 0ln ln ln 1k h vn z     . Here, 0 is a function of the debt-output ratio 
via n and z. Starting with any initial stocks of capital  0 0,k h and having the solution 
for the decision rules  , , , , ,a c e kn z     , we can track down the entire time path of 
capital accumulation  , ,t th  for 0t  . 
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   Observe that the physical capital-effective labor ratio, t , depends on its initial 
as well as steady-state values, 0 and  , according to the time-dependent weights 
 0,1t   and    1 0,1t  . The closer time t  is to the initial period 0, the 
stronger (weaker) is the influence of the initial 0 (steady-state ) on t . Since both 
0 and  are functions of the debt-output ratio via fertility n and leisure z to 
different extents, their time-dependent impacts on t  carry information regarding 
how a change in government debt affects capital accumulation in all periods (both the 
short and long run). This can be clearly seen in (A.5), where ln th is affected by the 
debt-output ratio through both the trend component and the transitory component.  
In order to study optimal government debt, we need to solve the value function in 
(1.1). By successive substitutions, rewrite (1.1) as 
 0
0
ln ln lnt t
t
V c n z  

    
   
0





D vn z h n z     


                        . 
Substituting the solution for  ln , lnt th  into the above expression of 0V gives 
(1.23).  
 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2 
We proceed in two stages. In the first stage we derive the optimal policy ( ** , bs  ). 
In the second stage, we establish its time consistency. For the derivation of ( ** , bs  ), 
we can simply equalize the competitive and the social planner solutions. The latter 
solution is a special case of the former by setting 1 in the absence of government 
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policy. The derivation in this stage is straightforward.  
For the establishment of its time consistency, it suffices to show that there is no 
incentive for the current generation to deviate from the optimal policy ( ** , bs  ) when 
expecting future generations to follow it. To this end, we first note that the welfare 
level of someone in period 1 is 111
**
01 ln)]1/(1[)/ln(),( hhksBBV b   
according to the solution for the welfare level. Here,     110001 hhAeh and 
001 /0 nyk k . Thus, the welfare level in period 0 is 
10000 lnlnln VzncV   . From the solution to households’ problem, we 








 are functions of 0s only, 
while 0n and 0z are functions of both 0s and 0b . We can thus write the welfare 
function as  
00 0 0
( , )bV F F s   ,  
















































































































































































We can now derive the first-order conditions of maximizing welfare by choice of 
0s and 0b in period 0, starting at the optimal government policy  ** , bs  . We then 
look at whether  ** , bs   can satisfy these first-order conditions. At optimum 


















 ekc , 
since )]1(1)[1()1()]1(1)[1(   , a useful technical 
note in the rest of the proof. 
We begin from the first-order condition with respect to 0s : 





















































(1 ) 1 { (1 ) [ (1 ) ]}
(1 )(1 ) k b e
s
n
       
               . 
Here, we have decomposed the first-order condition into two components 1G  and 
2G . The former component does not go though the variables ),( 00 zn  while the 
latter does. Substituting the expressions for 0/0 sc  , *c , *k , *e , )1(    
and 
00 0 eb
























































  **** ))](1(1)[1()1()]1(1)[1( 1 cccc    
 )1()1()]1(1)[1)(()1( ******   cccccc  
 *2* )]1()1([)]1()1()][1(1[ cc    















 *2*1 )]1(1)[1)(1()]1(1)[1( ccA    
     )1(1)1()1()1(1)1( 2*   c  
  )1(2    = 0, 
 ****2*2 )1()]1(1)[1)(()]1(1)[1( cccccA    
  )]1(1)[1(    
   )1()]1()1()1(1)[1( 2*   c  
  )]1(1)[1()]1(1[    
   22* )1(1[)]1()1(1)[1({  c  
  0)}1()1(1)]1( 2   , 
  * * * 2 *3 (1 )[1 (1 )]( 1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )c c c cA                         
*2)1( c            
  2* )1()]1(1)[1()1(1){1(c  
)}1(    
0])1()1()1()[1( 2*  c , 
  )]1(1)[1)()(1()]1(1)[1)(1( ****4  ccccA  
  2 * *[ (1 ) (1 )] (1 )c c            
   )1()]1(1)[()]1(1)[1{()1( ***  ccc  
  )}1(2    
  )1()1()]1(1)[1()1(1{)1( **   cc  
  0)}1(2   . 
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Thus, we have 021  GG  and hence 00 sF at the optimal ),( ** bs  .  
 We now turn to the first-order condition with respect to 
0b










































































   
Evaluate it at ),(),( **0 0 bb ss   and arrange terms: 
  )1)](1()1)(1()1)(1([ *c  
    )1)(1)[(1()1)(1(){( *** ekc  
  )]}1()1)(1(   . 
Substitute into it the expressions for ),,,,( *** ekc  and arrange terms: 
 )]1(1)[1)}{(1()1()]1(1)[1({ 2     
    )]1(1)[1({)}1()]1(1)[1(  
  )1()]1(1)[1()}{1()]1(1[)1(    
  2(1 )[1 (1 )] (1 )[ (1 ) (1 )]}                  . 
Observe that )]1(1)[1()1()]1(1)[1(   . Also, observe 
that )]1(1[)1( 2   . Using these facts in the first-order 
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condition for cancellation of terms yields the remaining relationship 
  )1(1)1()]1(1[)]1(1)[1(    
which indeed holds true since 
)1()]1(1)[1()]1(1)[1(   . Therefore, we also have 
0
0
bF at the optimal ),(),( **0 0 bb ss  . In sum, when expecting future generations 
to follow the optimal ),( ** bs  , the current generation has no incentive to deviate 
from it.  
The time consistency emerges from two features of the model. One of them is the 
recursive structure of preferences, with which the problem facing each generation is 
essentially the same with regard to proportional allocations of time and income and 
the choice of fertility. The other feature is the constancy of the optimal debt-output 
ratio over time, as well as the constancy of the level of fertility and the proportional 
allocations of time and income. The second feature is owing to the functional forms 
we use in this model. Q.E.D. 
 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3 














































c)(1  , 
where D is defined as  1   times the denominator of vn and z in (1.36) and (1.37). 
From these derivatives and the equilibrium solutions for the proportional allocations 
of output, we obtain 0/  bn  at 0 bs  when  
 
   [1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )]
(1 )[1 (1 )]
        
        . 




























The sign of it is determined by 0)1(1    at 0 bs . Further, we 
have 
   21 1 1 11 1e ee b
b b b
l s D s
D
     
                                 
, 
the sign of which is positive when /(1 )       at 0 bs . 
On the other hand, we obtain 
 2
[ (1 ) (1 ) ][1 (1 )]
{ (1 )[1 (1 )]}
e c b
s s s s
      
  
                >0 at 0 bs . 
























ec)(  , 
which is negative when [1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )] /(1 )[1 (1 )]                   
at 0.bs     Furthermore, we have: 
 2 2( ) 0
c c e e
c
z D
s D s s s D s
                           . 
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   21 11 1e ee e bl s D ss D s s
  
                            , 
which is positive when /(1 )       at 0 bs . Q.E.D. 
 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4 
For in the second-best case, debt and education subsidy financed by a labor income 
tax can help to raise the fraction of output spent on children’s education, e , to reach 
its first-best level,    * 1 /[1 1 ]e         . Together with (30), we can get, 
 
 
   1 1 11
1
11 1b
s    
 
                  
.                  (A.6) 
Then, we obtain  
 1 0





        ,                              (A.7) 
    
            2




           
                         
,    
(A.8) 
        2




       
                    
.               (A.9) 
Next, in order to obtain the second-best optimal subsidy rate s  and debt-output 
ratio b
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                         
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                         
                               
   (A.11) 
Solving (A.10) and (A.11) together, we can obtain one linear relationship between s  
and b
  as: 
         
   
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1b
s s      
  
 
                    
.        (A.12) 
Substituting (A.12) into (1.31),    * 1 /[1 1 ]e         , which further verifies 
that the optimal debt and the optimal education subsidy financed by a labor-income 
tax can achieve the first-best allocation of output. The proof of time consistency is 
analogous to that in the proof in Proposition 1.2. Q.E.D. 
 
 A.5 Proof of Proposition 1.6 
   The first-order condition ( ) 0bB   derived from (1.23) is: 
     
2
1 ( ) ( )( )
1 1 (1 ) 1







n z vn z n vn zB
n z vn z n vn z
n n vn z vn z




                              
                   
  
Note that ( )bB  is continuous and well defined for b b   , whereby b denotes 
any upper bound below which the solutions for all the variables 
( , , , , , )c e kn z l    are positive and hence valid. In particular, the upper bound is 
needed because the debt-output ratio may drive ( , )en  down to zero according to 
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(1.41) and (1.44). 
Using the results and notations in Appendix A.3, we rewrite the first-order 
condition as 
   
     2
( )( ) 0
(1 ) [ (1 ) (1 ) ][ (1 ) ]
b
b n z l
n b b
FB
D D D D     








( ) (1 ){(1 )[ (1 ) (1 ) ] (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) } (1 )[ (1 ) (1 )
(1 )]( ) [ (1 ) ]{[1 (1 )][(1 ) ]








D D D D
D D
D D
         
       
        
         
              
        
        
         2
2 2
)
[ (1 ) ] (1 )[1 (1 ) (1 ) ]




        
        
           
         
 
Through expansion, the above condition corresponds to a fifth-order equation:  
     5 4 3 25 4 3 2 1 0( ) 0b b b b b bF a a a a a a             . 
A unique optimal level of b exists provided that there are conditions leading to (i) 
( ) 0bB    at 0b   and (ii) ( ) 0bB    at *b such that *( ) 0bB   . (See 
Figures 1.1 to 1.3 as an illustration.) 
 The condition for (i) ( ) 0bB    at 0b  is 0 0a  . Through expansion and 
term collection on ( )bF  , 0a is found below: 
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1 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
(1 )[1 (1 )]
{ (1 ) [1 (1 )]}{ [1 (1 )] (1 )}
(1 )(1 )[1 (1 )] [ (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ]{[1
(1 )[(1 ) ] [1 (1 ) ]}
a            
           
          
          
          
         
           
        2
3 2 2
(1 )(1 )(1 )
[1 (1 )][1 (1 ) ]{ [1 (1 )] (1 )}
(1 ) [1 (1 )][1 (1 ) (1 ) ][(1 )
(1 )]{ [1 (1 )] (1 )}.
  
          
           
        
  
          
            
      
 
 Using the definition of ( , )  in (1.23), we rewrite it as 
     0
(1 )[1 (1 )] (1 )
1 (1 )
a f     




{ [1 (1 )] (1 )}{ (1 )[1 (1 )]
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[ (1 )] { [1 (1 )] (1 )[1 (1 )]}[1 (1 )]
(1 )[1 (1 )] (1 )[ (1 )] (
f          
           
           
          
         
         
          
          
2 2
1 )
(1 ){ [1 (1 )] (1 )} (1 )[1 (1 )]
[1 (1 )]{ [1 (1 )]} (1 ) [1 (1 )]
(1 )[1 (1 )]{ [ (1 )(1 )](1 )(1 ) (1 )
[1 (1 )]} (1 )(1 )[1 (1 )]{[1 (

          
          
          
       

         
         
         
        21 )] (1 )
[1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )]} [1 (1 )][1 (1 )] .
  
        
  
          
 
Observe that if 1  then 0 0a  and hence ( ) 0bB   at 0b  , namely that, if 
there were no externality, the competitive solution with zero government debt 
would be socially optimal (also see the sufficient condition below). For 0 1  , 
( ) 0bB   at 0b  under the condition that  is sufficiently large relative to 
 and  . That is, with the externality, the optimal debt level is positive if the taste 
for the welfare of children is sufficiently strong relative to the taste for the number 
of children and relative to the taste for leisure. Specifically, according to Proposition 
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1.3, if (1 ) 0      or equivalently /(1 )     then government debt has a 
negative effect on fertility. Also, if [ (1 )] /(1 )        , then government debt 
has a positive effect on labor.  
In addition, [1 (1 )] (1 ) 0            is needed for positive 
fertility, implying that  has to exceed its lower bound for a valid solution with log 
utility. From the expression for f, it is clear that f is positive, i.e. ( ) 0bB   at 
0b  , for a sufficiently large [ (1 )]    and sufficiently small  and  . This 
is because all the terms in the expression of f those contain [ (1 )]     are 
positive but some terms that contain either   or 
[1 (1 )] (1 )            are negative.  
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where the coefficients of the variables are 
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Also, the second derivatives of fertility and leisure are: 
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The second derivatives of fertility and leisure are well defined and continuous as 
their first derivatives for all valid (interior) solutions of ( , , , , , )c e kn z l     for 
b b   . Thus, under the same condition for permissible b , ( )bB  must be 
continuous and well defined as well.  
     Here, 1 [1 (1 )] (1 )             should be positive for a valid 
solution for fertility with a zero government debt level. When government debt is 
positive with the externality, this condition on  is not enough for positive fertility. 
For this reason, we further assume 0 0  , i.e. 
2{ [1 (1 )] (1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )}/                    .  
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      Also, denote 2 [1 (1 )][(1 ) ] [1 (1 ) ] 0                   for 
the condition under which government debt reduces fertility. Further, we 
denote 3 [1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )]              . It can be verified easily that, for 
[1 (1 ) ] /[ (1 )]           and /(1 )     (implied by the assumption 
that 2 0  ), we have 3 0  . Since  [1 (1 ) ] /[ (1 )] 1          and since 
the taste for consumption is unity in the preference, it is plausible to assume 
[1 (1 ) ] /[ (1 )]        as the upper bound on  (the taste for leisure), so as 
to help justify 3 0  . 
 With these notations, we use ( ) 0bB   to rewrite ( )bB  as 
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   
 
Clearly, all the right-hand terms above are negative under the restrictions 0i   
for all i and 0j  for 2,3j  . As argued above, ( )bB  and ( )bB  are 
continuous and well defined for all interior solution of the 
variable ( , , , , , )c e kn z l    . Thus, the result *( ) 0bB   at *b such that 
*( ) 0bB   and the fact that (0) 0B  under the stated conditions together imply the 
existence and uniqueness of the positive, optimal ratio of government debt to output 
in 0 b b    . If there were other positive, optimal debt-output ratios such 
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that *( ) 0bB   , at least one of them would violate *( ) 0bB   by argument of 
continuity over 0 b b    . 
 Finally, the time consistency of the optimal debt-output ratio holds true since 
the implicit optimal debt-output ratio is time invariant and since the model is 
recursive over time, as we summarized at the end of Appendix A.2. That is, the 
optimal debt-output ratio can apply to all generations if they follow it. Thus, the 
current generation has no incentive to deviate from the optimal debt-output ratio 
when expecting all future generations to follow it. Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
